

May 24, 1949

20

# The Reporter

*A fortnightly of facts and ideas*

*Price 25 cents*





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Editorial, Advertising and Circulation Offices  
220 East 42nd Street, New York 17, N. Y.

*In Berlin, women laborers ride  
the miniature railway used to  
clear the rubble from the city*

# The Reporter

220 EAST 42nd STREET  
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

May 24, 1949

## Dear Reader:

Now we have heard from a great many of you, and the first contact of *The Reporter* with its readers is established. This is, and will remain, a two-way communication. For a magazine like ours represents a compact with its readers, and successful compacts are those among equals who talk—and don't talk down—to each other.

We have now seen some of our fondest hopes and worst apprehensions shared by people known and unknown to us—hopes about the value of the job we've undertaken, apprehensions about the weight and importance of the subjects we want to deal with.

In forthcoming issues we shall report fairly regularly the responses to our questionnaires as they come in. We are glad now to start answering, one or two an issue, some of the criticisms that have been most frequently raised so far.

On unsigned articles, for instance. We have no particular passion for anonymity. Rather, our ambition is to offer our staff members and contributors a chance to produce their most personal, self-disciplined writing. But we have a curious predilection for ideas rather than for names; we think that sometimes anonymity allows a writer to express himself with greater freedom. At this time, we are engaged in a collective venture that requires teamwork: We want to reach a certain level of writing and reporting; we are busy building a platform. When the platform is built, we shall have a larger number of individual performances.

Some of you have applauded the idea of having every issue built (at least in part) around a theme; others have expressed doubts. We think thematic treatment leads to greater thoroughness in dealing with any given subject—a thoroughness that, we hope, will not be achieved at the expense of liveliness. We think that, by and large, American readers are tired of being told a little bit about everything. We shall develop the thematic approach, exploring all its possibilities, and we think we can make it work. We want to add, however, that our theme will not necessarily be a problem. It may be a certain kind of people or set of situations, communicated through a series of apparently unrelated articles.

## The Editors

# The Reporter

A fortnightly of facts and ideas

## Contents

Volume 1, No. 3

### EDITORIAL

#### *The Theme*

In this issue, we set ourselves to explode that much-used and abused slogan, the cold war. We have found evidence of the constantly growing political maturity of our own people. We have explored the new instruments that American policy has devised to give to the people of Europe some measure of freedom from fear and from want. We have tried to see what goes on among our Communist opponents and the record they have made in the countries they dominate. We have investigated the American record in the countries the Army controls; we have found it not quite unblemished, and we tell you why. But we have found that our country is learning fast and, in its struggle with Communism, is doing well.

### BRIEFS

### TOKYO

### EUROPE

### GERMANY

### DIALOGUE

### BOOKS

### Page 3 *We and They*

#### 5 *The People's Foreign Policy*

We, the people of the United States, must now be engaged in foreign policy for keeps. Have we a share in shaping it?

#### 9 *ERP After the First Round*

The United States is deliberately using its unique economic power to make western Europe as independent as possible of outside help

#### 11 *The Psychology Behind the Pact*

The North Atlantic Treaty may be an unnecessary warning to the East, but it is what western Europe needs to overcome the fear of war

#### 13 *From Wroclaw to the Waldorf...*

#### 14 *Russia's Reverse ERP*

The Soviet government concentrates on helping itself in its economic assistance to the satellite countries

#### 16 *Musical Chairs in the Kremlin*

Not old age or sickness, but consolidation of Soviet power in the East appears to be behind the recent reshuffling of high Russian officials

#### 17 *Russia's Peacetime Budget*

Seventy-nine billion rubles go for more heavy industry and a big army, but they are not enough for a shooting war

#### 18 *Will Russia Quit the UN?*

The Kremlin's future policies at Lake Success are indicated by its record

#### 22 *To Man's Measure...*

#### 24 *Gloom over Japan*

Democracy is not progressing, our Army is not leaving, the Bold New Program dismays unpurged industrialists

#### 27 *Fear in the West*

The Europeans have recent memories of invasion; can aid, economic and military, give them security?

#### 30 *Industrial Jungle: the Ruhr*

The U.S. government has given up on the job of clearing it out and has given the valley back to the Germans. Which Germans?

#### 34 *Platonoff's Republic*

Q. and A. on the source, use, and abuse of power within the unquestionably (or else) perfect State

#### 37 *The Absolute Weapon?*



# We and They



Perhaps now is the time to consider whether the expression "cold war" describes adequately the present stage of the conflict between the democracies and Communism. Immediately after Yalta, Russia launched a political offensive against the West that could have been called a cold war. But now the West has gained the initiative, and the conflict has acquired unmistakable features: it is a worldwide political strife in which the two rivals use all possible means to harm each other—short of war.

For an American policy has come into being—still groping, sometimes blundering, yet almost incredibly articulate when we compare it with the policy of six and a half years ago, in the days of the North African landings. Then for the first time the United States met face to face the internal political problems of a country that was entirely dependent on America but that America could not rule.

It's a baffling technique to master, that of exerting predominant influence on the lives of foreign countries and

at the same time respecting their independence. At the beginning of our education it could happen, for instance, that Roosevelt's bitter opposition to de Gaulle turned out to be the making of de Gaulle, and that the blessing given to an anti-de Gaulle leader proved to be a kiss of death. Gradually we have been learning how difficult and risky it is to sponsor regimes or parties or politicians in foreign countries. We can go up to a point, but no farther. Recognizing the no-farther point requires great political artistry. At best, we are now at the first, intuitive stage in our effort to master the technique of intervention in the internal affairs of foreign countries.

Yet the growth toward maturity of American foreign policy in the last few years is a thing to behold. In 1937, neutrality legislation was passed so that America would not be dragged into a second World War. Now, to make sure that we would not be left out of a possible new war, the American government has entered into the Atlantic Pact. General Bradley has said, "No more beachhead battles," just as the people of western Europe are saying, "No more liberations." In the last war the United States had a chance to fight for its survival only because the Japanese militarists were moronic enough to attack our farthest outposts in the Pacific. Now the American government has established a belt of outposts, a string of Pearl Harbors, in conditions of permanent alert from Iceland to Algeria. This is part of the short-of-war conflict. We are showing evidence of some physical power in the background, just in case. Even \$1,130,000,000 lend-lease to western Europe can do it. Should the opponent be inclined to use physical pressure, he is warned.

The blockade of Berlin tells the story: the airlift went on schedule with a little annoyance from buzzing Soviet

planes. Now the tough short-of-war game is played by both rivals. The United States is learning to assist its friends and to punish its opponents.

If the short-of-war clause could be openly acknowledged, and become reciprocally binding, then we could look with some confidence to the forthcoming conference of the Big Four foreign ministers. Unfortunately, there is one major obstacle: we are a complete enigma to the Communist leaders. The more articulate our policy becomes, the more baffled they are. This is not because of any particular wickedness or perversion on their part, unless it is the perversion of a hopelessly-wrong political philosophy. They just cannot grasp what to them is the mystery of our policy, of our behavior, and of our being. Even the fact of a four-power meeting shocks their peculiar, utterly physical brand of realism. Why four, they ask, when actually the protagonists are two? Why does the United States hold in its hands the destiny of France and Britain and then deal with them as partners and let them get quarrelsome or downright disagreeable? And why does the United States permit the sixteen countries of the Marshall Plan to enjoy such a broad margin of freedom in disposing of American dollars?

Probably there are two schools of thought in the Cominform: that which thinks that we are dishonest, Machiavellian hypocrites, and that which thinks that we are afflicted with congenital insanity. The second school of thought must be the one more inclined to think that an agreement with us is possible, for there is always a way of dealing with mad people. Sometimes, when Stalin used benignly to receive visiting Americans or make cyclical answers to American correspondents, he seemed to act like a genial, old-fashioned psychiatrist, who says, "Yes, yes,

of course you are right," and, "There is no reason why we should not get together some time." Probably both schools in the Cominform meet on the middle ground that we are both hypocritical and insane, and that the only thing for them to do is to go on with their set policies.

In developing their set policies they are quite obvious. They do over again what they have done before, with redoubled vigor in order to produce a redoubled shock on us. Before Secretary Byrnes made his speech at Stuttgart, they used to sell the same horse over and over again. Since the ERP began, they re-establish, and re-establish again, and strengthen their re-established predominance over the satellite countries. It was not enough for them to have subservient governments in nearly every nation of eastern Europe. Now they have to try to liquidate the Tito heresy. In this issue of our magazine the hypothesis is advanced that they may, as a next step, come close to incorporating the eastern countries into the Soviet Union—a hypothesis not to be lightly dismissed, particularly since Stalin at Yalta paved the way for such moves by having the Ukraine and Byelorussia recognized as sovereign independent states that could be admitted into the United Nations.

There is a weird, robotlike quality in the Russian policy. The Russian robot is a primitive one, made of powerful steel springs, operated by hand levers—with no electronic devices. Its impact is at the same time predictable and nerve-racking. It makes the same moves, with the same crash, only more so. Perhaps an example of this particular Russian attitude can be found in Stalin's military career. Like Roosevelt and Churchill, Stalin had to exert a decisive influence on military matters. But unlike the other two, he made himself a marshal. After a while, he made himself a generalissimo—a military rank that has been attained by only three other living men: Chiang Kai-shek of China, Franco of Spain, and Trujillo of the Dominican Republic.

We, on our part, are learning haltingly, intuitively, and with the help of considerable luck. Still, for some reason, we avoid putting down in firm, clear principles the hard lessons we are learning. It has dawned on us that we cannot imitate our opponent if we want

to win this political strife. We cannot counteract the Cominform with a Deminform. No matter whether it is in the Ruhr or in Japan, we cannot attempt to impose our type of political or economic order on a foreign country without courting disaster. We are even slowly learning that a country does not necessarily attain democracy by holding free and "unfettered" elections. The economic and social conditions that make for democracy, we are beginning to realize, are at least as important as the political crowning point of the democratic process, which is the free selection by the people of their own responsible leaders.

We have little taste for some of the governments ruling countries we support. This may be particularly the case with Greece. Yet we cannot call the aged Mr. Sophoulis and the leading Greek politicians to the United States in the same way that Mr. Dimitrov seems to have been called from Bulgaria to the Soviet Union. A bearable and, above all, removable government seems to be the best we can hope for in some of the countries whose destiny we determine.

Strangely enough, all the talking about the Four Freedoms was done during the war when they were just a noble idea. Now we are gradually learning how to work out the Four Freedoms in an integrated, well-balanced way, giving to foreign peoples some measure of freedom from fear and from want as a condition for the attainment of the others.

We have still a great deal to learn, and more than once a policy that might have been suicidal seems to have been stopped by chance. To take Franco in on our side, for instance, would have been and could still be such a policy; or to go all out for Tito, the Franco of the East; or to give political and military assistance to the Kuomintang. In general, our major and still quite real danger is that of falling into indiscriminate anti-Communism and promiscuous association with everybody who hates Russia. This has led us to accept Salazar's Portugal in the Atlantic Pact among "the parties [that] will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions." It was probably a tactical expedient that made us deviate from

our course. Our strategic aim is to strengthen and redefine the margin of independence of the democratic nations on our side, which is limited only by the necessities of their interdependence—an interdependence that must find its instruments in regional agreements and in the United Nations.

The more we learn and grow, the more bewildered they become. They play their game short of war but cannot bring themselves to understand that our game, too, is short of war—and here is the greatest threat to peace. From this lack of understanding, further deadlocks are likely to follow—on the settlement of Germany, for instance—and further attempts on their part to frighten us. They could some day present us with a united eastern Europe-Russia-China bloc—a sort of grand alliance of the Soviets and peoples' republics of the world, organized under the joint leadership of, let's say, Anna Pauker, Stalin, and Mao Tze-tung.

At the same time they cannot help wondering how it is that no champagne salesman gets hold of the direction of our foreign policy—a quick-witted realist who could go to Moscow and arrange a fast deal. For nothing would be easier than to split the world into halves, without all this nonsense of France and Britain and the United Nations.

We and they are really no match for each other. They are bound to overextend themselves and to get bogged down in the unending struggle with the people of the satellite countries of eastern Europe and of Asia, for they cannot help making their predominance over these people more and more crushing. We are becoming increasingly aware of our limitations and we are beginning to learn how to use our power within our means. If our course remains firm we can, with great vigilance but with much less apprehension, let them run their own course. For all world empires and, above all, all dictatorships ultimately die by suicide. The normal form of suicide is overextension.

We are disturbed when we see the stolid faces of their leaders. Perhaps this stolidity is the mask of bewilderment and fear. As far as we are concerned, if we go on acting and learning as we have done until now in this great strife short of war, we have nothing to fear.

# The People's Foreign Policy

*We, the people of the United States, must now be engaged in foreign policy for keeps. Have we a share in shaping it?*



The United States is in the midst of an experiment which no democracy has undertaken successfully before. It is committed to a foreign policy affecting the fate of almost the whole world.

This foreign policy, moreover, must be shaped during a period when the democratic tide is at its height. Britain had laid down the lines of its world role long before popular institutions had reached their present stage of development; and even Britain worried gravely whether or not it could entrust the keeping of its Commonwealth and Empire to the hands of men who had not been educated and trained in the classic mold. But it is one thing for a Labour Government to be able to carry forward, virtually unchanged, a settled policy; it is altogether different and tougher for the United States to formulate an original policy in the high noon of its democracy.

To realize how radical and unprecedented is the experiment, we need to recall that it has for a long time been axiomatic that a democracy resigns itself to having virtually no foreign policy at all. The two countries in which the people have ruled most directly and consistently—Switzerland and the United States—have provided classic examples of neutrality and isolation. All the nations which have played a dominant part in world affairs, from ancient Rome to nineteenth-century Britain, have been governed on aristocratic principles.

The European thinkers to whom the currents of our democratic thought can be traced warned of the limitations of democracy in dealing with matters

of foreign policy. John Locke urged that "what is to be done in reference to foreigners" be "left in great part to the prudence of those who have this power committed to them." Rousseau said simply, "Let the government negotiate and make treaties."

These men believed, in short, that the people were well fitted to deal with matters at home, but that experts and diplomatists must be relied on for the making of foreign policy. Tocqueville and Bryce came to the same conclusion.

Americans have not been a people easily disconcerted either by historical examples or authoritative precepts. If they were, they would never have undertaken many of their most successful ventures. They would find themselves now in a bitter quandary. Either they would have to abandon their world role, returning to the domestic tasks for which democratic government is primarily suited; or else they would have to reconcile themselves to forfeiting a voice in the matters of greatest consequence to their common life.

Fortunately the choice is not in practice so grim or absolute; yet there is enough in our day-to-day experience to suggest the need for looking squarely at the problem. No one can deny that the influence of public opinion has, when it has been potent in shaping foreign policy, frequently led to a course inconsistent with our basic interests as a nation. Nor can it be denied that some of the most far-reaching decisions in foreign policy have been made without the participation of the people and have won popular consent only because no alternative seemed to be open.

The prolonged insistence on neutrality legislation is an example of wishful thoughts and popular fallacies at work. More recently, if the emotions

of the people had been satisfied, there might have been increased pressure for adding to the billions which the Chinese Nationalists frittered away.

Among the occasions when the public has been left out, the formulation of the Greek-Turkish aid program comes readily to mind. Until the President announced in March, 1947, that a crisis existed and that immediate measures were necessary to meet it, the people had never dreamed of taking on heavy commitments in that corner of the world. The Atlantic Pact obviously required secrecy during the long negotiations with the other nations; but the need for secrecy is itself an explanation of why the sovereign citizen feels so often that the gravest





issues are determined without his sharing in them, and are presented to him on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

Faced with necessity, the United States has done remarkably well as a world power. The question is less one of whether it can measure up to its international responsibilities than whether, in doing so, its democracy may not be subtly transformed and diluted.

The drift away from traditional democratic patterns can be seen in several fields. Perhaps the most striking is the changing character of our Secretaries of State. It is unthinkable today that we should see in charge of our foreign affairs a simple man, naively representative of the people, like Bryan. Even the consummate type of politician, a Byrnes, will hardly reappear. We turned first, when we realized the scope of our world commitments, to a representative of the one elite we instinctively recognize—to a military man. General Marshall had many virtues, but not least of them (from the point of view of his Secretaryship of State) were an aloofness from popular pressures and opinions and a toughness in dealing with the outside world.

But it is the figure of Dean Acheson which most perfectly sums up the new type of diplomat. Urbane, liberal, assured, he can match wits with the most experienced of the Old World. The people are gratified to have such talents at their service, yet one cannot help feeling that they find themselves a little cut off from the problems he handles. After he had turned aside the pig-bladder blow of a Stalin peace feeler, in the first weeks of his office, and had riposted with the rapier of dialectic skill and ironic phrase, the public applauded—and then wondered whether the whole performance had not been just a little too cool and perfect. In him or in a successor, democracy may find its Metternich, its Talleyrand. But again, in so doing, may not democracy lose something of its original flavor?

The dampening and curbing of the democratic spirit may be discerned again in the emphasis upon "unity" and on bipartisanship in our foreign policy. Obviously, the two parties cannot be encouraged to make political hay out of a temporarily burdensome or unpopular foreign program. They cannot, as they succeed each other



in power, pursue alternate policies—blowing first hot, then cold toward Russia; or giving and then withdrawing aid from a Chinese government. Indeed the tendency of political parties to act in precisely this way has helped convince the political scientists that a democracy cannot have a strong or consistent foreign policy; and it is the avoidance of these tendencies by the United States since the war that has seemed so admirable and surprising.

During the Presidential campaign Senator Vandenberg took pains to insist that the strategy of bipartisanship which he had done so much to establish did in fact leave plenty of room for discussion and dissent. It meant, he said, not the suppression of debate, but the treading out of the widest area of agreement possible; and it meant that where such agreement had not yet matured, as in Palestine or the Far East, the parties were free to differ.

Senator Vandenberg was speaking wisely, yet it is easy to see how his insight, only slightly vulgarized and misapplied, could provide an excuse for suppressing party activity in a large and growing sphere. If political parties in a free state were only gangs of men seeking power, this would perhaps not be a loss. But to the extent that they do bring their special enlightenment and values to bear upon the nation's problems, their exclusion from the whole field of foreign policy is certainly not to be encouraged.

One more indication of the subtle changes being effected by the emphasis on foreign policy is to be seen in the relationship between the State Depart-

ment and the people. The State Department has been told that the people are ignorant of foreign affairs and that therefore it must tell them about what it is doing and seek their support. An elaborate system of public relations is being created.

By an unnoticed transformation the State Department seems to have shifted its attention. It has learned that the citizen of, say, Omsk, Russia, must be enlightened in regard to our views and intentions. Is this any less true, they suddenly ask, with regard to the citizen of Kalamazoo, Michigan? Unconsciously it begins to apply the same technique of persuasion to both.

Other countries may be the *objects* of our foreign policy. The influencing of public opinion is one of the many instruments for giving that policy substance. Our own people, however, are the *source* of policy. If we blanket them with propaganda we shall find that we can no longer hear what they are saying. If we resort to polls and special investigators to learn their will, we shall be substituting mechanical tests for the creative processes out of which democratic programs emerge.

It would be inconceivable for a department concerned with some aspect of domestic policy to undertake a high-pressure publicity drive to make its course acceptable. Even the recruiting campaigns of our armed services are apt to make the average citizen slightly uncomfortable. But the idea of unity and a single national interest is so deeply imbedded that propagandizing by the State Department is more tolerantly viewed.

The department falls into the habit





During the war it did much to give foreign-nationality groups a sense of participation and a feeling of having made some contribution. It brought to San Francisco representatives of all the major opinion-forming groups in the country, and by being receptive to advice and prepared to give as much information as possible, saved the United Nations from seeming an alien or hazardous concept. The department's new emphasis on public relations, when it is not merely patronizing, is an exploration of ways of forging the vital link between the expert and the plain people.

The forming of a citizens' group to sponsor some specific move in our foreign policy has become so common as to be almost part of our institutional system. Fight for Freedom, Inc., and the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies were only the first of an almost continuous chain which has included committees to support the United Nations, to secure ratification of the Atlantic Pact, to promote a united western Europe, and so forth. These have all been given access to information which could not be divulged to the public as a whole. But inevitably such committees have suffered from the law of diminishing returns; their membership, and particularly their leadership, has tended to be drawn from the same old circle.

Whatever the methods, the aim must be for genuine communication between the people and the experts. There is a knowledge and mutual trust, a pervasive agreement on underlying values, which in some circumstances can be a kind of substitute for direct contact. The experts come to act with an intuitive awareness of what the people will consider right. The people recognize the emerging policy as something familiar and basically their own.

This deep permeation is totally different from the assent that may be cultivated through a skilled information program; neither the propagandist nor the advertiser will know how to attain it, or sense it when it exists. It is the outgrowth of the most basic level of education. It springs from the full interchange of ideas and sentiments which is characteristic of the democratic process at its best. It demands a corps of officials who are not cut off from the ordinary citizen either by

of thinking of itself as "an island, intire of itself," sending out messages to the equally benighted and passive people on both sides of the national boundary.

The answer, needless to say, does not lie in insisting that the people take the initiative in foreign policy. There have been some naive attempts to extend the New England town-meeting idea into the realm of international affairs; for example, an amendment to the Constitution, seriously proposed and discussed in the late 1930's, called for a popular referendum before war could be declared. But the arguments against it were incontrovertible. Such a direct appeal would have given play to the worst forms of jingoism and emotionalism. It would, moreover, have followed decisions and commitments by the government, so that the people's choice would have been more nearly compulsory than free.

Direct popular initiative is rare in domestic policy; it is totally inapplicable to the making of foreign policy. According to the homely classical dictum, the people are the best judge of the worth of a policy because they know where the shoe pinches. But in foreign policy the shoe is usually on someone else's foot. The effects of a bad foreign policy, or the benefits of a good one, are so indirect, so delayed, so imperceptibly cumulative, as to make the corrective of public opinion ineffectual.


Curbs on popular intervention become, therefore, not only understandable but necessary. A diplomacy wise as a serpent (and usually gentle as a dove), carried out by a civil-service elite; an emphasis on unity even to the

extent of confining legitimate party activity; a broad effort by the State Department to indoctrinate the citizens—these are all normal responses of our political system. But in the end something positive is required besides such relatively harmless limitations on our traditional practices.

If the United States is to play in the present age the role for which destiny seems to have prepared it, it must play it as a democracy. If it is to contribute something besides the old and often repeated failures of history, it will be because the foreign policy of the nation is a *people's policy*—formed out of their aspirations and insights, however it may be administered from day to day. The need is not only to escape the slow withering of democracy as we go forward in new tasks, but through the development of new techniques to make democracy more effective.

The nature of these techniques cannot be laid down *a priori*. They will have to be discovered by our statesmen and political scientists as we move along; and the best of them we shall perhaps not even recognize until, long after they have become habitual, some one points them out to us. But already we can see enough to indicate that there are ways by which democracy and foreign policy can be combined—a middle ground between the assumption of the Jeffersonian democrat that the people must do everything and the assumption of the modern democrat that the people must be submerged under propaganda.

The State Department must be credited with fruitful experiments in bringing the people to share in its decisions.



temperament or by the exigencies of their careers. Indeed, their careers, like that of Adlai E. Stevenson, now Governor of Illinois, could combine with profit elective and diplomatic posts.

In addition to these, the steady hammering out of issues, the point and counterpoint from which a synthesis can be formed, requires a press that can present the alternatives clearly and provocatively. Something better than the feverish and deliberately misleading presentation of a Hearst or a McCormick is a prerequisite.

The press stands between government and people, limited only by its sense of responsibility. It can interpret one to the other. It can be the possessor of "off-the-record" information which gives authority to its judgments. The discussion can be keyed to popular standards without being as blunted as in ordinary political debate.

It is not too much to say that the way the press meets this challenge will determine whether or not the United States can become the first democracy that has marked out and not strayed from a bold path in international affairs.

New techniques, and a new vigor and sense of responsibility in the utilization of old techniques, are important. A foreign policy democratically controlled requires, however, something more fundamental. The policy itself must be of a kind which is suited to the peculiar dynamics of popular institutions. A program which is devious, over-refined, and over-subtle, which shapes itself not according to principles but to the shifts and turns of foreign powers, is by its nature unfitted for democratic control. A policy of containment is necessarily sudden in execution, requiring temporary alliances and expedients which the people, if they felt free to do so, might reject.

It is remarkable that the two periods of our greatest influence in world affairs have been under Presidents who were to a high degree sensitive to pub-

lic opinion and democratic processes. Wilson and Roosevelt both felt the need for keeping the people with them. Their experience suggests some of the characteristics for which a democratic foreign policy must aim. We criticize them now for having seemed to place too great a reliance on general statements and the enunciation of points, but in fact these men were feeling their way toward the kind of policy which grows out of the people's consciousness and which the people can comprehend and sustain.

The Fourteen Points and the Four Freedoms are alike in being reasonably simple and lucid. They are alike in corresponding to the people's desire for universal standards of right. Compared to the flexible policies of older nations, the concepts perhaps seem unsophisticated, but they meet many of the tests of a democratic policy.

Roosevelt and Wilson had got hold of a big truth. Their reliance on general principles, however, takes into account only a part of the values which the democratic citizen supports and comprehends. If he seeks for universal standards, he appreciates also the local and individual. He understands intuitively the uses of compromise, senses the indirect effects which stretch out from a particular adjustment.

The society of which the democratic citizen is a part is composed of groups, regions, economic interests, as the world where he makes his influence felt is composed of great and lesser nations. The only kind of stability he knows at home is a moving equilibrium, a shifting balance of forces. There is no reason why he should not be able to act constructively in maintaining a comparable balance in the world.

It would be a counsel of despair to maintain that democratic processes must be sacrificed in pursuing a mature foreign policy, any more than they must be sacrificed in waging a modern war. It would be equally a counsel of despair to maintain that the only policy

consistent with democracy is a simple universalism. That mankind become more or less the same everywhere, with national differences eliminated, is one aim which democracy may pursue. But it is by no means the only one. We are free to choose, and free to maintain democratic procedures both in making the choice and in carrying out the decision taken.

The danger is that we grow apprehensive about these procedures and give in, bit by bit, to the idea that we must leave matters in the hands of specialists. But the foreign policy of the United States is not something for a few men to please themselves with, and the people ought not be patronized by having a "Voice of America" turned upon them.

The people have their own voice. More significantly, they have many voices, as they have many visions and many economic and regional interests. There is the voice of labor (and within labor—as the leaders of the big unions sometimes forget—many divergent tones); there are the voices of the farmer, the small businessman, the big businessman. Unless these are heard, and brought together through the processes of democratic debate and compromise, we have a foreign policy only imperfectly representative of our country. What is equally bad, we let our institutions become limited and emaciated.

The United States has had the longest continuous experience with democracy of any modern country. It mastered the first great challenge to its system when it showed that democracy, which had been thought to be only possible over a geographically small area, could be extended to embrace a continent. The challenge which has arisen with the compulsion to play a leading role in the world—not to play it intermittently, by casual interventions and the enunciation of moral principles, but to play it consistently and for the greatest stakes—can be mastered also, provided we see the problem clearly and apply to it our political inventiveness.

# ERP After the First Round

*The United States is deliberately using its unique economic power to make western Europe as independent as possible of outside help*

"I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old," said George Canning, the British Prime Minister, in 1826. Today the New World is not being called into existence; it is not an appendage of the Old. The United States has deliberately set itself to redress the balance of the European Continent by giving all its support to the western nations. It has also decided to define and limit the role it is playing in terms of the amount of help it can give and the length of time the job will take.


The first year of the Marshall Plan has now been completed. Substantial progress in western European industry

and agriculture has been reported to Congress; Communism has not engulfed the western half of the Continent. But this is only the first round. Western European production has come close to its prewar levels, but that is not enough, for populations are larger than they used to be. Most of the sixteen nations would still have to increase their exports to a point that may be beyond reach to make up for wartime losses in invisible earnings and for the disintegration of their Asiatic empires. Finally, western Europe needs massive concentrations of capital to complete industrial reconstruction and to modernize antiquated techniques.

What is perhaps equally important is the degree of unity achieved so far by the recipient nations. There have been promising signs—the attempt at economic integration in the Benelux countries, the recent trade treaty between France and Italy, and a start in the coordination of national investment plans. There is no reason, however, to

rope that I think was responsible partly perhaps for making possible the Atlantic Pact. . . . Out of that unity in Europe, provided we become a part of that community of nations and remain a part, lies our best hope for peace."

This togetherness is developing, in the opinion of many Congressmen, much too slowly. The Europeans have admitted that individual plans for using American aid do not together form a consistent regional program. They intend to export to one another more than they are willing to import from one another. They count upon manufacturing more finished goods than they have the raw materials for;




become overenthusiastic about these well-meaning steps, for the resounding declarations of economic unity are not easy to translate into actions.

Paul Hoffman is, to be sure, optimistic. "Out of the meetings of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the Council of Europe, the Benelux countries," he has said, "you have a 'togetherness' developing in Eu-



## ECA Millions in fiscal '50 (Estimated)



they hope to sell overseas more than the markets appear able to buy.

The individual goals are high. If the separate objectives of all the nations are achieved by 1952-1953, production levels for all of western Europe will be 30 per cent higher in industry, and 15 in agriculture, than they were in 1938.

It is not in self-help, but in mutual help, that the sixteen nations appear dilatory. Congress, Mr. Hoffman, and the countries themselves agree that this year is the critical one for the Marshall Plan. The OEEC has suggested that the important things to be accomplished this year include vigorous control of inflationary pressures, the elimination of duplicating investment programs, the examination of investment plans to make sure that they will make sense and money in the long run, and radical changes in export policies to guarantee that the OEEC countries can compete with the United States on at least equal terms wherever they overlap. Hoffman adds that convertibility of European currencies is one of the most urgent steps to be taken, and Secretary Snyder has reported his conviction that some European countries had better devalue their currencies in terms of the dollar.

To all these propositions, the general as well as the particular, well-informed Europeans offer certain qualifications. To begin with, they say that the bal-

ance of the Old World cannot be redressed by a frontal attack upon European nationalism. National solidarity, they point out, is the chief remaining unifying force among Europeans. They remind Americans that, except during the nineteenth century, there has always been at least a ghost of a sense of European unity, along with the less ghostly sense of nationalism.

To get more specific, no amount of American indignation or pressure can make the British enjoy the prospect of merging their stubbornly-defended pound with the unstable franc or the uncertain lira. Before pound, lira, and franc can be exchanged freely, France and Italy have to show a record of growing production and coordinated monetary and fiscal policies.

From these and the other conflicts of principle now being waged among and within the parties to the Marshall Plan, there can emerge a consistent mutual program. The plan involves a permanent recognition of the community of interest between western Europe and the United States. We should be deluding ourselves if we thought that twenty billion dollars, good advice, and good-bye were the sole three elements of the ERP. Some of the good advice may very well come from the other side of the ocean. We Americans, for instance, must accept the necessity of buying

more goods from European producers.

This, in economic terms, discloses the distinctive feature of the ERP. The strength of the program is that it is designed to help the nations involved in it separately and together. Like all national and international policies, the Marshall Plan is concerned with the development and control of power and is an exercise of power. But it is an exercise of power in a peculiarly American way. Instead of monopolizing power, of gathering it increasingly to ourselves, we are using the vast power we have to generate power in other countries. This applies to economics as well as to politics. We cannot, of course, expect by 1952 a western Europe after the model of the U.S.—although if the European nations move in that direction, the American people will certainly applaud. Nor can we hope that after 1952 Europe will no longer need some measure of economic assistance; the dollar scarcity will not be so easily overcome. The economic restoration of western Europe is bound to remain precarious as long as the Continent is split between East and West.

Yet by 1952, western Europe—because of the economic power the U.S. will have generated—will be thoroughly unrecognizable from what it was when George Marshall announced his plan for redressing the balance.



# The Psychology Behind the Pact

*The North Atlantic Treaty may be an unnecessary warning to the East, but it is what western Europe needs to overcome the fear of war*



"The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently . . ." Consequently, they hope, there will be no such armed attack. One of the things that has given commentators trouble in discussing Article 5 of the Atlantic Pact is that its root idea is so extraordinarily simple: to keep the peace in Europe by making it clear that a breach of the peace would be a most unprofitable business.

Article 5 is not only obvious, but for Americans there is almost nothing new about it except that it is stated formally. Since May, 1945, it would have been quite impossible to subject any of the signatories of the pact (except Norway) to an armed attack without conducting an armed attack on American forces in Germany, Austria, or northern Italy. Article 5 is a restatement of present policy as a twenty-year commitment; it is not a great new departure—the departure came four years ago.

This does not mean, of course, that the formal acceptance of this principle is unimportant. It is always helpful to get a policy out in the open where its implications can be examined. The hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee may have seemed tedious. Senator Donnell, on one side, and Mr. Wallace, on the other, were not trying to be helpful; this is not surprising, since Senator Donnell's unstated major premise is that the rest of the world has no business existing, while Mr. Wallace's is that bears like honey. But the hearings were useful, and Senator Donnell's questions actually helped strengthen the treaty. The

wariness of Senators Vandenberg and Connally gave place to the candor of Mr. Acheson and General Bradley. The main commitment of the treaty was as far-reaching as Senator Donnell feared it would be. Most people wanted it that way.

The hearings formed a notable stage in the progress of an undertaking which has been negotiated in the classic tradition so clearly laid down in the Constitution and so seldom honored.

Mr. Lovett began the negotiations on the advice of the Senate; he and Mr. Acheson have conducted them, with one or two unimportant lapses, in close cooperation with the two most responsible Senators; the result is an open covenant, more or less privately arrived at. The general objective has been perfectly clear at all times and has had evident public support; the specific language of the instrument required extremely ticklish negotiation, and the question of membership was more touchy still. There are items in the treaty that are evidently the result of compromise (how democratic is Portugal?), and the boat rocked for a while when the Norwegians and the Danes climbed aboard, but on the whole a most complicated diplomatic labor was successfully accomplished, in good time and in good spirits, by the men officially charged with such labor. This is not the only way to do business with foreign nations, but it has its advantages.

It also has its minor disadvantages. Among nongovernmental students of foreign policy, in the universities and the research foundations, the treaty has been greeted by a muted chorus of "Yes, but . . ." It would be ungracious to suggest that this response is dictated by annoyance at not having been consulted so lavishly as has recently been customary; it is better, and in most

cases more accurate, to suggest that if these men had been able to raise their objections during the negotiations, they would perhaps have been reassured as to their substantive doubts, and persuaded that their less grounded fears could be cast aside.

There are two main themes among the "Yes, buts." They are "Stick to the UN" and "Treaties never work." Both have a certain validity, in that the treaty *could* be used to undermine what little the UN is doing about war prevention, just as it *could* become just another brittle balance-of-power arrangement. But the weakness of the UN is a cause, not a result of the treaty, and Mr. Acheson has underlined the point that the treaty is not to be construed as a denial of American interest in the maintenance of peace outside the Atlantic area. Soviet chatter about charter violations is of course nonsense, subject to an immediate *reductio ad absurdum*: since the UN Charter clearly does not prohibit the federation of any member states under a single sovereignty, how can it prohibit their association in a lesser undertaking, that of collective self-defense?

The only possible answer to the argument that treaties never work is that this one is different. Luckily the answer has considerable substance. This is not a balance-of-power undertaking; if anything, it is intended as an unbalance-of-power performance. None of its members, furthermore, is likely to choose a different side. Most important of all, this is emphatically not a game of choosing up sides for a balance-of-power war; not one of the signatories has the smallest interest either in war or in the fruits of war. All of these nations, except Italy under Mussolini, have been friends, and most of them

allies in wartime, for more than a century, and the Italy of the treaty is the sobered Italy of de Gasperi and Sforza.

Some of the confusion behind this talk of the general danger of treaties arises from a central misconception of the nature of this treaty. The misconception is not confined to the doubters; it is to be found among many strong supporters of the pact. The assumption is that because the treaty talks about what its parties will do in the event of armed attack it is mainly concerned with war. The treaty is nothing of the kind; it is not even a step in the cold war, for that worn-out phrase, if it ever referred to anything, certainly does not describe the present situation. The treaty is not designed to contain Communism but to promote freedom.

Article 3 provides that "The parties . . . by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." The paradox of the pact is that this militant sentence arises from a policy confident of peace.

We can understand the meaning of this clause only by recalling that the treaty is aimed, in the first instance, not at Americans, nor even at Russians,

but at the people of Europe, sitting under the shadow of a number of Russian divisions which should make Mr. Wallace blush when he talks of U. S. militarism. Europeans are interested in just one thing—a reasonable assurance that those divisions will not march west. Thus the first purpose of the treaty was to state a position that would strike the Europeans as making war unlikely.


But the Europeans and particularly such political leaders as M. Spaak and M. Queuille judge treaties, quite properly, not by words but by the actions they are designed to lead to. The theory of the treaty is that of collective self-defense, a *pledge* in Article 5, a *plan* in Article 3. Self-defense means exactly that—defense of oneself—and for Frenchmen and Belgians that is not quite the same thing as self-sacrifice. So the treaty, from the beginning, was seen in western Europe as an avowal whose real value would only be obtained when the Americans made it clear that they actively accepted the principle of collective self-defense.

A military man was the first responsible American official to point this out. General Bradley, on April 5, said to the Jewish War Veterans, "It must be per-

fectly apparent to the people of the United States that we cannot count on friends in western Europe if our strategy in the event of war dictates that we shall first abandon them to the enemy with a promise of later liberation." An American military assistance program based on the defense of Europe is the only possible effective demonstration that we mean what we say.

Fortunately it now seems clear that there will be such a program. Whether it will be as large as the Administration wants it is not clear, and if it should be cut, tactical errors of the Administration itself may be largely responsible. What matters here is that there will be a program. And what matters still more is the nature of the program, which is the clearest proof that confidence in peace, not preparedness for war, is at the root of the treaty.

Although it would not be the walk-over that is often casually assumed, a Soviet attack on western Europe could not now be stopped short of the Channel. More than that, it is generally recognized, in Fontainebleau and the Pentagon, that only an all-out mobilization could make the Rhine fully defensible in two years' time. It is therefore striking that no one in authority anywhere is planning an all-out mobili-



ization. Both the planning of Field Marshal Montgomery and the assistance program—screened and re-screened—of the United States are on so modest a scale that they would be absurdly inadequate in early war. The Administration has asked for a little over a billion dollars in the first year, and it has indicated officially to Congress that it expects the program in later years to cost the same or less. The military strength of Europe is to be rebuilt, but only gradually.

It follows that the program is not designed to meet the *threat* of war, although naturally it is hoped that neither plans nor arms would be wasted in such an event. It is designed instead to meet the *fear* of war in Europe. It is certainly a permissible psychological weapon against fear, for it happens to be based on the actual present assessment of the situation. We do not expect an early Soviet attack; we *do* believe that Europe should be defended; we *are* planning to make the defense of Europe part of our strategic thinking.

This decision under Article 3 is the really significant new commitment under the treaty. It is a big one, much bigger than a mere promise to make aggression against western Europe a *casus belli*. But it is only the logical extension, delayed by foggy thinking, of the principle of the Marshall Plan.

The record shows that under Article 3, as currently interpreted, the American government intends to use mutual military assistance as an instrument for promoting confidence in peace. It might not have been so. It might have been true that the treaty was a means to bases in Norway, or that the tempting ranges of the Pyrenees would have led to an invitation to Franco Spain. But there are to be no bases in Norway, and Spain is not to be a member. Not atomic bomb squadrons, but anti-tank guns and tactical aircraft are going to Europe. The plan is to defend Europe; the immediate purpose is to prove that this is the plan; the larger purpose is to take a further step in the Atlantic policy of the free states of the West. The whole rests on the assumption, never more believed than now, that western Europe and North America are mutually indispensable friends in the never-ending struggle for freedom. This is a policy for peace; it is not a strategy for a war of any temperature.

## From Wroclaw to the Waldorf...

There have been ugly rumors that the House Un-American Activities Committee has dropped its circus techniques in favor of a pallid, stick-to-the-facts conservatism. A pamphlet recently published by the committee should go far to correct this misapprehension. It is called a *Review of the Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace . . . Held in New York City on March 25, 26, and 27, 1949*.

After characterizing the Scientific and Cultural Conference as a "super-mobilization of the inveterate wheel-horses and supporters of the Communist Party," the pamphlet establishes the connection between it and the Communist-inspired World Congress of Intellectuals at Wroclaw (Breslau, once upon a time) in August, 1948, by stating that eleven of the 562 sponsors of the Waldorf affair attended the Wroclaw gathering. Two of the eleven do not, however, appear in the committee's apparently full list of New York conference sponsors at the back of the pamphlet. These are "Clifford Durr, attorney," and "Freda Kirchwey, singer." (The singing career of Miss Kirchwey, the editor and publisher of *The Nation*, has attracted little attention from the critics.)

Further along in the pamphlet one Richard Boyer, a writer, is said to have advocated "civil disobedience" at one of the panels. As the pamphlet points out, "It would be well to give serious consideration to the insidious intent behind his carefully chosen words."

"The writer," Boyer had declared, "cannot safely surrender his conscience . . . to Truman."

The pamphlet continues: "It is by no means accidental that Richard Boyer's appeal for civil disobedience was directed to an audience which included the following atomic scientists: Harlow Shapley . . . William A. Higginbotham . . . William Orr Roberts

[who is probably the same as Walter Orr Roberts] . . . Philip Morrison . . . Victor Weiskopf . . . Oswald Veblen . . . and Albert Einstein." This point might have been stronger had it not been for the fact that none of the scientists was actually in the audience of the Writers' Panel at which Boyer spoke, and three (Weiskopf, Veblen, and Einstein) did not attend the conference at all.

The main body of the pamphlet is devoted to listing the Communist-front affiliations of the sponsors. They are listed according to the number of subversive organizations to which they belong. The grand prize in this category is taken by Rockwell Kent, who "has been affiliated with at least 85 Communist-front organizations"—almost all of them, in fact, except the Communist Party itself. Altogether, 373 of the 562 sponsors are shown to have been associated with at least one Communist-front organization.

The sponsors have also been involved in various undertakings which were not formal organizations and could not, therefore, be declared subversive. "Supporters of Communist Bookshops (total 69)"; "Appeals in Behalf of 'Red' Dean of Canterbury (total 1)"; "Mother Bloor's eighty-fifth birthday banquet (total 11)"—Rockwell Kent was there—; "Sent Greetings to Soviet Union, 1942 (total 3)"; "Support of Soviet Union, miscellaneous (total 55)"—surely a modest estimate—; "Visits Soviet Union, miscellaneous (total 13)"; "Protests against anti-Soviet film, *The Iron Curtain*, signers (total 13)"; "May Day Parade, 1939 (total 1)."

This invaluable little document may be had from the Government Printing Office at fifteen cents—small cost when compared with the price of somewhat similar works by the New England clergyman, Cotton Mather.



# Russia's Reverse ERP

*The Soviet government concentrates on helping itself in its economic assistance to the satellite countries*



Until fairly recently, the statesmen of the Western Union, divided by what sometimes seemed irreconcilable differences, must have wondered how the bosses of eastern Europe appeared to get along with one another so well. This was astonishing because the easterners were not sharing the contents of a Marshall Plan cornucopia; the horn of plenty which Russia extended to them acted strangely like a vacuum cleaner.

Now Tito has talked. He admits that the eastern countries have all along been practicing a devil-take-the-hind-most imperialism, which, according to Marx, is peculiarly capitalist behavior. Tito's tug-of-cold-war with Stalin seems to have acquired the flavor of the divorce court. Like an injured blonde, Tito has begun to spill some of the intimate details. Specifically, he charges that the reason why Yugoslavia appeared faithless in the eyes of Moscow was that it refused to remain a backward country exporting raw materials to other countries so that they might later ship back finished goods. "Where," he asks rather wistfully, "do we find true socialist relationships between the socialist states?"

Soviet exploitation began even as the victorious Red Army was sweeping over eastern Europe, taking into possession everything which might conceivably be claimed as "booty" or "war trophy." It was natural that the Russians, who had lost untold billions in the war, wanted compensation. But this scarcely justified, for example, the seizure of railroad cars, synthetic oil plants, and rubber industries from Poland, which had suffered equally at German hands. As

far back as 1947, Washington experts calculated that the entire Soviet take in "booty" up to that time was three billion dollars.

Reparations and German "assets" from ex-enemy Hungary and Rumania—another form of compensation the Soviet Union asked and got—seemed reasonable at the time of Potsdam. No one realized that such reparations would give the Soviets a chance to set up a brand of twentieth-century "mercantile colonialism" in these countries. In Hungary alone they seized approximately two hundred industrial plants. Some were packed up and shipped home, but most were left where they stood and incorporated into five giant "joint companies" (plus five not yet set up), holding monopolies over Hungary's river and air transport, oil fields, and mining. The Soviet Union contributed "German assets"; Hungary contributes capital and labor. The managers who have the final say on employment, production, and export are Soviet, not Hungarian, citizens.

A glance at the Soviet-Hungarian treaty setting up these companies (never published in Hungary) indicates

how far Soviet control extends over the economy of that country. Soviet profits are tax-exempt and payable in advance each year in the form of merchandise. The Maszovlet (Hungarian-Soviet Civil Aviation Corporation) can import without permit or duty restrictions; the Meszhart (Hungarian-Soviet Shipping Corporation) has been reimbursed by the Hungarian Government for a loss in operations; the Hungarian-Soviet Bauxite Aluminum Corporation has first option on all prospecting, and can veto the prospecting bids of any other company. In Rumania, the Sovrompetrol (controlling 60 per cent of Rumania's oil production) was guaranteed by treaty a 15-per cent profit for the year 1947. In capitalist countries, these practices used to be known as the "squeeze," the "kickback," and "most-favored treatment."

But the main instrument of Soviet economic domination in eastern Europe has been bilateral barter trade. By means of a series of trade agreements with each of the satellites, initially for one year and then for five, the Soviet Union now holds just about the same domineering position over their total export and import trade that Germany held in the late 1930's. Instead of dumping cheap, frequently worthless, industrial commodities upon them as the Nazis did, the Russians have taken commodities in short supply in exchange for Soviet raw materials and agricultural products. Czech shoes, Rumanian oil, more than 50 per cent of Hungary's semi-fabricated products have gone to the U.S.S.R. when they were desperately needed at home.

The details of this sort of barter have been kept so secret that no one has been able to estimate how unfair the terms of trade are. Now, Tito claims that he was forced to sell the Soviet Union





molybdenum at one-tenth the price it cost Yugoslavia to produce it, and that he was paid in rubles with which he could not obtain machinery and other equipment for Yugoslavia's Five-Year Plan. He charges that the more industrial Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia also made a pretty penny at Yugoslavia's expense. Mining equipment from Czechoslovakia arrived without motors; deliveries of metals were only one-third fulfilled.

On the other hand, Yugoslavia did not hesitate to do some exploiting itself whenever the opportunity arose. Tito removed practically all consumer goods accumulated in Albania during the war by Italian merchants and produced there since the war.

In short, it appears that bilateral barter operates among the Communist nations much as it has operated throughout history. The larger, stronger, or more industrialized country always manages to get the advantage over the smaller and more backward.

purposes. In 1948, they announced a loan to Poland of \$450 millions for the construction of a large iron-and-steel aggregate which would practically double Poland's output. This loan is to be repaid in goods over the next ten years with three per cent interest. By the terms of the loan, Russians, not Poles, draw up plans for the plants and determine their location.

The Soviet policy of stripping satellites of their resources does not go very well with the policy of encouraging their plans for self-development. In the main, the short-run policy, which is to exploit, has crowded out the policy that would seem more beneficial to all in the long run. Aside from Poland and Czechoslovakia, there is little evidence that the Soviet Union cares much about the five-year plans of the satellites.

Last September, Communist bosses from most of the satellite countries were summoned to Sochi, in the Crimea, for

eration in Paris. Instead it will probably serve as a sounding board for programs already worked out by Communist leaders.

Meanwhile Tito, despite his crocodile tears, has not found life so tough outside the Cominform, cut off without a ruble. He now finds a large and eager dollar market for copper, bauxite, and other raw materials. The U.S. has loosened export restrictions on all but directly military supplies; American contractors are busy working out plans for huge industrial developments; the British are negotiating an estimated \$430 million trade treaty.

Undoubtedly, many jealous glances are being cast toward Yugoslavia from other parts of eastern Europe. The successful example of Tito may have been the inspiration for some of the independent thinking which has broken out in other capitals: Gomulka and Minc in Poland, Kostov in Bulgaria. But the Soviet response has been quick and hard. Gomulka recants; Kostov is de-



Moreover, the dealing in this case is carried on secretly by political and economic czars loyal only to Moscow.

The Soviet Union has not extended much economic aid to its satellites. When severe droughts resulted in crop failures throughout eastern Europe, the Russians shipped grain to Rumania, Poland, and Czechoslovakia with great fanfare. But contrasted to food allotments under the Marshall Plan, these shipments were in the form of short-term interest-bearing loans.

What little industrial aid the Soviets have supplied has been for exploitative

a personal conference with Stalin. There they were directed, according to an authoritative report, to work out detailed plans for the economic integration of eastern Europe and to begin the real squeeze, political and economic, on Yugoslavia.

Most likely the recently-formed Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is to be the front in this new phase of integration. Since it has no secretariat and meets only sporadically, the council is not likely to have a policy-forming function similar to that of the Office for European Economic Coop-

moted from First Deputy Premier to Head Librarian. Therein lies the vast difference, economic and political, between Yugoslavia on the one hand, and Poland and Bulgaria on the other.

There is little prospect that the backing and filling going on now as the satellite leaders are faced with Kremlin orders to push collectivization will be effective. Instead, the steady consolidation will probably continue until the satellite nations are remade in the image of the Soviet Republics—perhaps to be welcomed one day into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

# Musical Chairs in the Kremlin

*Not old age or sickness, but consolidation of Soviet power in the East appears to be behind the recent reshuffling of high Russian officials*



The recent, rapid shifts in high Soviet ministerial posts were clearly dictated by something more than political or propagandistic expediency. They surely represent more than a changing of the guard; they are not to be explained by sudden, simultaneous onsets of age and illness. By what, then? As usual, the Kremlin reveals nothing; it suggests riddles and withholds solutions. Perhaps the reshuffling foreshadows new basic tactics, major alterations in administrative strategy, a general sharpening of policy toward the West.

Four men whose names carry a certain disagreeable majesty outside of the U.S.S.R. have been removed from ministerial posts—Molotov, Mikoyan, Bulganin, and Voznesensky. (The last seems to have been dropped out of the Politburo altogether.) Their specialties, in order, are foreign affairs, foreign trade, defense, and economic planning—fields that, taken in their totality, have to do with strength, the strength of Russia and all of eastern Europe.

Since there is no apparent pattern to these changes, the reason for them must be sought by trying to figure out the logical nature of the new assignments. Where and how could Soviet leaders in these all-important fields collaborate most effectively?

In trade, defense, foreign affairs, and

production Moscow has now to cope with two formidable western policies—the Marshall Plan, and, even more, the Atlantic Pact, which Russian leaders interpret as a military threat. To combat them, the Kremlin must strengthen its ties with the satellite countries immediately and drastically. What could be more sensible than to put the country's best men to work on the problem?

The Kremlin's conception of a strong, dependable defense against the West requires that every satellite state be shockproof and surprise-proof, a condition which does not exist today because of the widespread resentment of highhanded Communist control. Only in Rumania does the situation seem satisfactory from the Soviet point of view. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, little Albania, and certainly Finland still require a great deal of attention, pressure, economic assistance, and purging.

The last will probably mean that Laurenti Beria, the Soviet secret police chief, will be joining the four leaders mentioned, making it a Big Five that will push the consolidation of the entire Iron Curtain orbit. Let us consider the other four:

Nikolai A. Voznesensky, until recently the Chairman of the State Planning Commission, was the youngest member of the Politburo and one of the few "new Bolsheviks"—party members without revolutionary experience—to be elevated to that august assembly. The omission of his name from the last listing of Politburo members might be interpreted as an indication that he has fallen out of favor with the Kremlin, though his planning genius (he was principal author of the current Five-Year Plan) would seem to make him

a good candidate for the group to tackle the task at hand.

When Marshal Nikolai Bulganin was removed as Minister of the Armed Forces in March, there was speculation as to whether political leaders were being replaced in Soviet ministerial posts by technicians, and it was further pointed out that Marshal Vasilevsky, his replacement, was a younger man and therefore more fitted for the job. Bulganin, however, at fifty-three is by no means a valetudinarian.

With A. I. Mikoyan, the hearty, shrewd ex-Minister of Trade, and Vyacheslav Molotov, former Foreign Minister, the situation was different. When they were relieved from their ministries, yet retained in the Politburo, the sager speculators immediately concluded that the move was a step up. They were freed from their duties, it was decided, to assist Stalin in framing diplomatic and economic strategy.

Whether the reshuffling which began with the removal of Foreign Minister Molotov is part of a large-scale plan to streamline the control of the eastern satellites remains to be seen. Russia's realists do not expect each satellite to be brought to an advanced state of "consolidation" at some immediate calendar date.

The Kremlin will formally incorporate a satellite state into the U.S.S.R. whenever such a step best suits Moscow's propaganda requirements, and the much-utilized "will of the people" will proclaim the incorporation as "voluntary adherence." Meanwhile integration of most of the satellites will take time and maneuvering. But with the completion of the process there should emerge a powerful new weapon in the war of diplomacy and nerves.

—ROBERT MAGIDOFF

# Russia's Peacetime Budget

*Seventy-nine billion rubles go for more heavy industry and a big army, but they are not enough for a shooting war*



The Soviet Union is producing goods and services worth about 80 billion dollars this year. The United States is producing about 240 billion dollars' worth. From economic ramparts of roughly these heights the two nations confront each other.

Which country is devoting more wealth to building up its military power? The United States, certainly; with its more ample resources it is spending more for all purposes. This fact ought to stop alarmist talk that America is allowing the Soviet Union to get a lead in military preparedness.

A more significant question is: Which country is using a greater portion of its total output for military purposes? Here the answer is—the Soviet Union.

Familiar to the point of boredom is Russia's attempt to prefix "peace-loving" to itself and "warmongering" to the United States. So it was no surprise when, at the March meeting of the Supreme Soviet, A. G. Zverev, the Finance Minister, proclaimed that America is pursuing "the policy of unleashing a new war, a policy which is being followed by the U. S. ruling circles striving for world hegemony"; he added that U. S. military expenditures in 1949-50 as stated in the President's message to Congress were to be 38 per cent of total budgetary expenditures, and that such spending was to be nearly fifteen times greater than in 1938-39. Zverev made this pronouncement dur-

ing his presentation of the Soviet budget for 1949, which called for military expenditures of only 19 per cent.

Now the facts are that our military budget is 34, not 38, per cent of our total budget, and that this is twelve, not fifteen, times the outlay we made in 1938-39. But, far more important, Comrade Zverev might have mentioned two other facts:

First, the Russian budget includes the expenditures not only of the central government, but also the larger share of the spending of republican and local administrative units. If Mr. Truman presented such a consolidated, all-government budget, the U.S. percentage would plummet.

And second, the Soviet budget includes most of the spending of its socialized enterprises, i.e., most of the important economic organizations of the country. If Mr. Truman included the accounts of the large American business firms, the percentage would drop still further.

U. S. economists estimate that in the calendar year 1949 Russia is devoting about 10 per cent of its total output to defense (79.1 billion out of 800 billion rubles), as opposed to the United States' five per cent (12 billion out of 240 billion dollars). The American military outlay includes funds spent on defense-plant construction, whereas the Russian figure does not. (Excluded in both cases is atomic energy research expenditure. Moreover, the Russians leave out the cost of internal security forces.) Clearly, then, the Russian citizen will pay a greater share of his income for military purposes than the American, and from a pocket much less well-lined.

Nobody says that Russia's 1949 budget is a war budget; it would be unprofitable to combat nonsense with

nonsense. The military portion of total Russian output in 1949 is about the same as in 1939, a portion not designed to support a policy of large risks not to say of war.

The military outlay this year is some thirteen billion rubles more than it was last year. Some part of this rise can be explained by higher wholesale prices and railroad freight rates. Evidently Russian leaders see no reason at present for a major increase in preparedness, a fact that might well be given more publicity in the western world.

Military spending has fallen away sharply from the level of 138 billion rubles at the peak of the war effort in 1944, when prices were lower anyway. Since Comrade Zverev's figures can probably be trusted on his own territory, it appears that Russia has radically reduced the size of its military force. From some twelve and a half million men, it may be estimated now at no more than four million.

The accent in the 1949 Soviet budget is on continued industrial development. Some 152.5 billion rubles will be devoted to "national economy" purposes in 1949, chiefly for industrial growth. Non-budgeted outlay will add 37.4 billion to make a grand total of 189.9 billion rubles, compared to 162.9 billion in the preceding year.

This emphasis also is in line with the prewar situation of the 1930's, when much of the country's strength was devoted to the construction of capital facilities. In the test of war it was learned that such facilities were useful in two ways—tractors in peace, tanks for fighting. The most rapid growth of its industrial potential is Russia's secret weapon.

Then, too, a good part of Russia's effort today is being devoted to healing



the deep wound the war made in its economy. From one-quarter to one-third of Russian fixed capital was destroyed. Industrial enterprises employing some four million workers were put out of commission, and 47 per cent of the total crop area lay in lands occupied by the enemy. Soviet spokesmen boast that they will restore their industrial production in less than the six years it took them after the first World War. Already a large part of the repair job has been completed, with industrial output already in excess of the 1940 level, but some scars will remain even after six years. The growth of heavy industry in the eastern U.S.S.R., unknown after the last war, provides an offsetting factor today.

In spite of a rigid austerity, however, the present-day Russian rate of economic growth is not as high as in the past. Its exceptionally high rates were achieved only at the start of its industrial career. For each of the successive Five-Year Plans the annual average rate of industrial growth has gone down. In the first plan, it was about 20 per cent; then 17; then 13 (but interrupted by the war); and now, in the plan ending December 31, 1950, about 10 per cent. But this is for industry as a whole; the growth of heavy industry alone has not declined as much.

Russia would be able to move forward faster with foreign assistance, but it preferred to rebuff the Marshall offer. Consequently, Comrade Zverev is correct in stating that "the enormous resources for the Communist reconstruction of society can and must be found only within our economy."

Strangely enough, only during the war was the Soviet Union in really active economic intercourse with the outside world. This consisted of accepting military-economic assistance from the United States, Great Britain, and Canada. At present outside economic intercourse is mostly through a small volume of trade with eastern Europe, Britain, and Sweden and the reparation deliveries that will amount to about one billion dollars by 1953, not including those from Germany.

The budget speech begins and ends on a note of optimism. The keynote still is Lenin's abiding slogan: Russia must "overtake and surpass the advanced capitalist countries technically and economically."

## Will Russia Quit the UN?

*The Kremlin's future policies at Lake Success are clearly indicated by its past record*



Three years ago, when Mr. Gromyko walked out of the Security Council rather than acknowledge its right to discuss what Soviet troops were doing in northern Iran, it appeared to an

apprehensive world that the Soviet Union would leave the United Nations altogether unless it supported Soviet policy on all fronts and in all aspects. Since then there have been other issues and innumerable near-walkouts from the Security Council, all part of the fluctuating war of nerves.

When the General Assembly reopened its third session last month, it seemed uncertain whether the Russians had finally made up their minds about leaving or sticking with the United Nations. The same afternoon that Gromyko was photographed shaking hands with Mr. Acheson, he made a speech denouncing the Atlantic Pact as a breach of the fundamental principles of the United Nations. It has often appeared as if Soviet policy toward the


United Nations has shifted, almost day by day, with the needs of the moment, with every change in public opinion and the balance of power.

The question arises whether Soviet policy within the United Nations is as enigmatic and mercurial as it appears. Is there a policy at all, and if there is, does it change as frequently as it seems to? Time and again, the spokesmen for the western nations have attempted to see behind the vagaries in Soviet policy, behind the contradictions between Soviet definitions and Soviet actions, between socialism and Soviet imperialism. About the only constant things, and they come up in nearly every committee, are the six negative votes or the six abstentions of the U.S.S.R., Byelorussia, the Ukraine, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.

One fact has slowly emerged from the welter of reports, minutes of committees, and summaries of proceedings which record the multifarious activities of the UN: The Soviet Union has a policy towards the United Nations, and has, in fact, had one all along without any appreciable change. This policy has







dictated every Soviet action, not only in the conspicuous political assemblies, but even in the obscure daily routine of the UN Secretariat, the Trusteeship Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the specialized agencies. To arrive at this policy, the Soviet Union seems to have taken into account three factors:

1. To what extent can Russia and its satellites use the UN to attack and undermine the West?
2. To what extent can they prevent the UN from becoming what it was meant to be?
3. To what extent can they prevent the West from learning what is happening within their territories?

This, perhaps, seems an unnecessarily callous interpretation, but as anyone who has attended a UN debate knows, the attitudes of all great powers and many small ones are always realistic and, when necessary, callous. (Diplomacy, said Ambrose Bierce, is the patriotic art of lying abroad for one's country.) The question about this interpretation of Russian policy is whether it is borne out by the way the Russians have conducted themselves.

To start with the first point: How do the Russians attempt to use the UN and its agencies to undermine the West? The chances are that it is not by using every Russian employee in the United Nations and its agencies as a spy, as the more frenzied witchhunters, shocked and pleased by the Gubitchev case, like to think.

Actually, there are more fundamental and subtle ways. In the days of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, for instance, Soviet spokesmen habitually criticized the allocation of funds to Greece and Italy; they said the programs for these coun-

tries were disproportionately large compared with those for Yugoslavia and Poland.

In the third council of UNRRA, which met in London in August, 1945, the Western powers proposed to raise the scale of UNRRA's allotment to Italy from an emergency \$44 million to \$400 million. This was blocked by the Soviet delegation until the West agreed to a *quid pro quo*—the expenditure of nearly \$250 million for Byelorussia and the Ukraine. (A Canadian delegate was so incensed at this horse-trading that he remarked: "The idea of UNRRA was that the uninhabited countries would help those which had been invaded and occupied. If Byelorussia and the Ukraine are to be regarded as independent countries, the rest of Russia was unoccupied and should be asked to contribute to the common pool.") When the UNRRA Italian program was finally approved—about \$300 million in U.S. dollars and the rest in sterling and other "soft" currencies—the Russians and Yugoslavs promptly stated their reparations demands on Italy. These, as it happened, amounted to exactly \$300 million and, if granted, would have meant that Italy had served as a conveyor-belt to transfer the money from the West to the East.

Then there is the Trusteeship Council, a branch of the UN that Russia finds especially useful because it gives her the chance to condemn colonialism and to pose as the champion of the underprivileged. (She has steadily refused to account to the United Nations for such territories as Lithuania, Esthonia, and Latvia on the ground that these countries joined the Soviet Union of their own free will.) So far, the Russians have not approved a single report on any of the trusteeships. In the Trusteeship Council, they have every now and then had to look hard before they could find anything to object to. In the case of Western Samoa, which is administered by New Zealand, they protested against the unequal division of land between the Samoans and the white inhabitants. It was pointed out that the Samoans are fishermen who believe they can remain healthy only by living near the sea. They have resisted all attempts to settle them in the interior, or to have agricultural blessings imposed upon them. The Russians received this explanation silently. Their

protest was one more arrow in the quiver of Radio Moscow.

The Russians then revealed a critical interest in the cultural life of Samoa, which, they figured, was going to, or had never got out of, pot. They were finally convinced that there was a Samoan music, a corpus of Samoan poetry, and even, in some villages a movement to produce Shakespeare in the vernacular; all in all, the general feeling of the rest of the council was that Samoan culture was moving along swimmingly. This impression was not shared by the Russians. After a further scrutiny of the report, they raised the question of why Samoan school children were compelled to sit crosslegged on floor mats, instead of chairs. The answer was that this was the way the islanders preferred to sit down, but that in any case the New Zealand government was furnishing European-style school equipment, including chairs that the Samoans will undoubtedly loathe.

The Russians' activities are not always directed to what the British delegate called "incorrect, mischievous propaganda." Every nation administering a trustee territory can be called upon to give the council information on any subject, and the U.S.S.R. has used this rule to ask for a detailed statement of the composition and functions of the police force in the French Cameroons. Every member of the Trusteeship Council may make such requests, but Russia alone has shown an almost morbid interest in the methods of



maintaining law and order in underdeveloped areas.

Though Russia may regard such things as slowing up the recovery of Europe, making a point about Samoa, and learning how police operate as dividends from the UN, it nevertheless regards that organization as a constant threat to its security. Thirty Soviet vetoes have been used, as a last resource, to prevent UN from acting internationally on major issues, and there have been even more Soviet abstentions—which can sometimes be as damaging as vetoes. The advantage of abstention is that it is a way out of the embarrassment of opposing an ideologically popular cause; in fact it gives a nation the air of accepting or even sponsoring such a cause, while reserving freedom of action to invalidate it.

Abstention was the way in which the Russians disposed of Article 13 of the Declaration of Human Rights as adopted by the General Assembly, an undeniably popular article which says:

"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

"2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country."

When these paragraphs were debated in a committee of the General Assembly last December, the U.S.S.R. proposed that the words "in accordance with the laws of the state" should be added to the article. This phrase was rejected by 24 votes to 9. After other amendments had been tried and rejected, the article was put to a final vote. It was adopted by 33 votes to 0, with eight abstentions.

All of the declaration's thirty articles were debated in similar fashion and voted on separately, some of them phrase by phrase. And since the vast verbiage of UN council and committee meetings is now running into the production of about three hundred documents a day, it is scarcely surprising that this skillful use of the abstention on terminology has remained unnoticed.

A slightly different technique was used in the UN Conference on Women's Rights, which opened in Beirut in March. Among other things, the conference had planned to discuss the position of Soviet wives of foreigners, as well as their right to accompany their husbands abroad. Any discussion of this

topic would have been academic; the Soviet delegate did not turn up at Beirut.

At this stage of the UN's development, the Russians are particularly guarded about any activities extending into their sphere of influence, whatever the activities may be and whichever of the UN agencies directs them. A few months ago, for example, the Soviet government abruptly resigned from the World Health Organization. No reason was given in its brief note to WHO, but it may have been significant that WHO had announced plans to set up missions all over the world, obviously including Russia, in an attempt to control epidemiological diseases. Russia is less concerned with smallpox and typhus than with "western infiltration," by doctors or any other kind of technicians. Dr. Brock Chisholm, the Canadian Director-General of WHO, was bewildered at the Russian action. He sent a message to Moscow, saying he awaited an invitation to go there to clear up the matter. He is still waiting.

The hostility of the Soviet Union towards any truly international functioning of the UN is best shown by a little incident which took place March 18, when the Economic and Social Council was considering a report of the Inter-



national Children's Emergency Board. The Russian delegate, A. V. Maevisky, contended the Children's Fund was using more money to pay for specialists than for serum in its anti-tuberculosis campaign in eastern Europe. Corley Smith, of Britain, termed the Russian proposal "most ungracious" to the Scandinavian countries which provided the specialists—particularly considering that "the U.S.S.R. had not

contributed a penny" to the fund. The council then adopted, by a vote of 16 to 0 (Russia and Byelorussia abstaining), a resolution noting that more funds are necessary to meet this year's programs of aid to children.

Now none of this is reason for fearing that the Russians are sabotaging the UN. The Russians are not in a position to do so, even by walking out. If they should walk out, they would leave the way open for a thoroughgoing reorganization of the UN—its procedure, secretariat, and specialized agencies. By remaining in, the Russians can continue to exploit the UN for all it is worth and to obstruct the UN when they can.

But it is clear that the Russian leaders in their approach to UN must be drawing an almost daily balance between the advantages and the disadvantages of the United Nations. The advantages are obviously lessening and the disadvantages increasing. The western nations are more wary of Russian tactics than they used to be. The ECA has been established in spite of all attempts to kill it off. The UN is even to cooperate in Mr. Truman's program of technical aid for underdeveloped territories. The specialized agencies are expanding their work, even those excluded from the Soviet sphere.

The question which no one outside the Kremlin can answer is this: How far will the usefulness of membership in the United Nations compel Russia to make concessions to its principles and functions? At what point may the Russian leaders decide that the disadvantages outweigh the advantages? For it is only on this basis of selfish interest that the Russian government—or any other government—would make up its mind whether to abandon the United Nations. Unlike the West, however, the Russian government is not influenced by the wishes of its people in the matter. To state the issue in these terms is, of course, to propound yet another riddle, for no one can say what the Russian leaders believe is to their interest and what is not. But if their past behavior is any indication, they will be guided by their usual cold appreciation of the facts and not by any sudden fury in debate. Gromyko can use ominous phrases when he is told by his masters to do so, but, on leaving the podium, he is capable of extending a hand to a Western diplomat.

# At the Front in the War of Nerves

*The roar of the juke box, the whine of the flat-trajectory statesman . . .*



*"Why don't we send all this stuff over to Russia—as a threat to their way of life?"*



*"Before making official application for the right of asylum he wants to know what the income-tax rates are on book, magazine, and movie royalties."*



*"Would it be all right to speak of an 'aggressive, imperialist, tyrannical, autocratic, lawless, coercive, irresponsible, barbarous, and inquisitorial despotism' just as long as I don't mention the Soviet Union by name?"*



*"We'll have to revise our plans, comrades—I suddenly realized that we can't count on American Lend-Lease to help us out in another war."*



# To Man's Measure . . .

## Fish, Radar, and Diesels



In 1919, John Masefield wept over the desperate flight of *Reynard the Fox* all through a long narrative poem—where two notably English virtues, the love of sport and the love of fair play, met in a conflict which, forty years later, the Labour Government, proposing the abolition of the so-called “blood sports,” has yet failed to resolve. No one—the Walrus and the Carpenter were concerned with oysters—has wept into the salt sea over the fate of sardines, tuna, herring (*clupea pallasii*), sharks, or minnows, although these beasts are pursued as relentlessly as foxes. The United Nations Conference on the Scientific Conservation and Utilization of Resources, Section Meeting, Wild Life, Fish and Marine Resources, recently considered the subject without maudlin emotion and we, too, think we can treat it calmly, having been brought up to believe that fish have no feelings.

It seems harder than we thought to get away from an anthropomorphic view of the lot of present-day fish. There they are in the sea, tearing each other to pieces, the big ones devouring the smaller, the smaller gobbling up the minute, held to the age-old necessities of the struggle for existence, viewing man's bait, hooks, harpoons, and nets as habitual hazards—and now, suddenly, they must cope with extraordinary

new instruments that man's inventiveness first set in action against his fellow man and now has turned against them.

Every fish now is a submarine. The fishing fleets of the nations, for once united, maneuver in hot pursuit. They spot the fish by aircraft; they track them by radar and echo sounding devices; radio telephone summons them to the kill and they converge on their prey propelled by high-speed Diesel engines.

What defense have the fish? Only this: they present to man's inquiring eye glaucous depths of uncertainty. Why are there good years and bad years for the fisherman? Will there always be plenty of fish to fish for? The fish keep their secret.

They operate with silence, cunning, and unpredictability. A paper presented to the UN conference modestly notes: “In Alaska, warmer springs apparently result in year classes of greater abundance (of the British Columbia herring) . . . but on the west coast of Vancouver Island colder springs and summers result in greater abundance. . . . Fluctuations in abundance are largely independent of the quantity of eggs deposited. . . . This agrees with the views expressed by Hjort (1926) for Norwegian herring and cod, but disagrees with those of Jensen (1927) for Baltic herring. . . . Fluctuations of abundance in year classes (which can

be very pronounced: 624 in 1931; 110 in 1936; 741 in 1943—British Columbia herring) must be due primarily to annual variation in survival rate at some stage of the life history between egg deposition and recruitment.”


So, as yet, we don't know much. No doubt we shall end, as we often do, by knowing everything. We shall discover the secret of this critical period and be able to regulate it. We shall be able to ration plankton, the minute larvae upon which all marine life depends.

Already there exist sea cows and sea horses (*hippocampus guttulatus*), those diminutive, erect, and heraldic figures which, in mythology, drew Neptune's chariot. Perhaps we shall domesticate all the beasts of the sea and add the oceans to our gardens and pasture lands—shepherds may some day walk subaqueous plains guarding their flocks, intrepid mountaineers descend the deepest chasms to hunt elusive chamois.

Meanwhile we can only weigh our catch and be glad when it is a good one. The figure, by the way, for British Columbia herring this year will be over 50,000 tons.

## The Blessed Isles

At a meeting of the UN Trusteeship Council: Fourth Session; 25th Meeting; Examination of Annual Reports: Western Samoa, certain questions were





put by the representatives of the U.S.S.R. and the Philippines to the Special Representative of the Administering Authority (New Zealand) Mr. Grattan.

Mr. Carpio (Philippines) got off to a rapid start with a run of ten questions. That this demonstrated a Philippine intention to take a leading interest in the Pacific Islands only gradually dawned upon the Soviet delegate. When he realized what was happening he sat up alertly and attempted to take over the questioning. He made a brilliant run of fourteen but Mr. Carpio ended strongly and at the close of the session the two were tied 18-18.

Mr. Carpio took the laudable stand that Samoans should be treated on terms of strict equality with the European inhabitants of Samoa. He worried at the fact that, while regulations prohibited the sale of liquor to both Europeans and Samoans except for medicinal purposes, Europeans were granted the necessary permits and Samoans were not. This seemed to show Anglo-Saxon hypocrisy and Mr. Carpio suggested that the regulations be made to fit the facts: "I would prefer to call black black, rather than call it white." To which Sir Carl Berendsen (New Zealand) retorted: "I think the answer is that it is often Black and White" (much laughter, complete bewilderment of the Russian translator).

Mr. Carpio was also concerned to discover that only about sixty Samoans earned more than \$800 (£200) a year. He thought this figure very low and urged the Administering Authority to improve the earning capacity of the indigenous inhabitants and thus raise the standard of living.

Mr. Soldatov (U.S.S.R.) was more concerned with the questions of land tenure, the educational system, native culture, native laws, and social organization. He approached these subjects

with detached and academic interest.

Mr. Grattan talked pleasantly of Samoan life: "In Samoa the claims of the family are absolutely paramount. A person leaving one village and going to another has merely to go to the house of a relation; he will be taken in without question, fed, clothed, sheltered. . . . For the most part the Samoans depend upon a subsistence economy for their livelihood. They plant their food on their own land; they fish in the sea and in the rivers; they cut copra and cocoa from their own plantations. . . . In Samoan society there is no such thing as poverty as we understand it. I have not met any Samoan who would wish to change places with us and our way of living."


Men are more exposed than are fish to the scrutiny of man. No one has any plans at all to provide the fish of the ocean with sanitary conveniences or with a social ideology. But the Samoans are menaced—by all that is best in man's insatiable thirst for equity. In the case of Samoa, for once, there is nothing to grab. In the case of Samoa, for once, there is nothing to recriminate about: New Zealand is exercising its mandate ably and in the most enlightened spirit. It is just that it is impossible for an advanced modern civilization to look at a people whose life is based on agriculture and fishing, and who are not wage earners, without feeling that something should be done about them.

This is laudable and even generous but for technical reasons our desire to assist others appears inseparable from

an assumption that their society must be made to resemble our own.

Mr. Noriega (Mexico) expressed the ensuing dilemma: "My own personal opinion is that some doubt might exist in the mind of the Administering Authority when it contemplates the possibility of industrializing this island. . . . We all know from history and experience that the process of industrialization often has correlative unpleasant consequences. . . . Samoa seems to be a kind of Paradise Lost, and a program of industrialization, if put into effect there, might have this kind of unpleasant effect. . . . However, our interest is higher standards of living, better health conditions, and so on, for all of which purposes *more money* (italics ours) would be needed; and as the inhabitants of Western Samoa have to depend on a purely agricultural economy, their economic capacity is necessarily small, and will be small so long as they are an agricultural people."

Like the fish of the sea, and as defenseless, the Samoans on their islands await our decision as to whether or not to put them into factories.



# Gloom over Japan

*Democracy is not progressing, our Army is not leaving, the Bold New Program dismays unpurged industrialists*



The new, experimental Japanese democracy is passing through a painful period. The people are still fond of democratic slogans, but recent events have begun to distort their meaning.

There is in Japan a new emphasis on "normalcy." Premier Yoshida recently sent a private memorandum to General MacArthur saying he needs the help of Japan's most competent financiers and business men if the new economic stabilization program is to work; he asked permission to "unpurge" a large group of ultranationalists with fiscal and industrial talents to provide such help. Yoshida's request was promptly rejected, but it laid bare the hope that occupation authorities will sooner or later have to begin dropping principle for the sake of expediency.

In casting up a balance sheet as this particular occupation approaches the end of its fourth year, it can be recorded that the worst and most chaotic hardships have been surmounted, but the country is a long way from economic stability. Wage-price relationships in terms of both domestic and foreign values are still askew, and the expansion of industrial production and foreign trade has not liquidated the black market. The United States is spending more than a million dollars a day to keep the Japanese on a subsistence diet, and Japan with amiable fortitude is content to enjoy democracy so long as the dole continues.

But it is understatement to say the

zeal for political reform has largely spent itself. From the beginning the Japanese ruling classes viewed MacArthur's reforms as an Americanized version of Mussolini's castor-oil treatment. They made the usual wry faces and swallowed as little as possible, hoping that the occupation forces could be hustled out of the country before the submerged masses perceived that their way of life was changing. The longer the occupation lasts, the more that hope dwindles. Last year, anticipating a Republican victory in the Presidential election, Japanese reactionaries prepared to amend MacArthur's reforms to death. Truman's re-election upset those calculations, and just as long as General MacArthur remains Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, it will be hazardous for the old feudal oligarchy to reassert itself openly. No matter how skillfully their efforts are blunted by SCAP experts, it can be taken for granted that Japanese reactionaries will use any artifice or subterfuge they can invent to adulterate the reform program started by MacArthur.

The question of Japan's future has been profoundly influenced by the "cold war" and the harum-scarum development of American policy in the Far East. Until March, 1947, when President Truman challenged the Kremlin's expansionist program, Japan's ruling classes had been sure of winning the peace. In a spirit of servility, they had undertaken to

comply with all occupation directives, certain that compliance would shorten the occupation and minimize its disruptive influence.


Even the ultranationalists in Japan were slow to grasp the implications of the Truman doctrine. In March, 1947, they were carried away by General MacArthur's announcement that his job was done; and they joyfully endorsed his plea for a quick and lenient peace treaty. Nearly a year had passed before the Japanese were ready to acknowledge that prospects for a treaty had grown infinitely remote. Today, treaty speculation has subsided to a whisper; it is apparent that peace in Asia must be preceded by a general, global understanding between the United States and Russia.

Japan's position was further compromised by Communist victories in China and the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek's regime. The prospect that a Red spearhead may dominate the Asiatic mainland has made the Japanese acutely self-conscious, bereft as they are of all armaments and even of all hope of rearming themselves in

this generation. The presence of American military forces ceased to be very distasteful to all but the Communists. With increasing emphasis Japanese spokesmen began asserting the community of interests between themselves and the western democracies. They were convinced that Japan as the "bulwark against Communism" in Asia not







only could but must play host to foreign occupation forces, even at the price of having to put up with their democratic idiosyncrasies.

In the last five or six months, a succession of events has further shaken the confidence of the conspiratorial Old Guard in Japan. Washington authorities in December issued a tough economic directive. It ordered the Japanese to halt inflation, tighten credit, balance the budget, increase exports, reduce subsidies, stabilize wages and prices, and improve the machinery for rationing food and raw materials. It threatened to cut off the dole unless Japan made a more strenuous effort toward self-sufficiency.

The reaction was what might have been expected. The public was dismayed. Political saboteurs saw another avenue for manipulation closed against them. Labor was alarmed at the implicit threat of mass layoffs and unemployment without compensating social-security benefits. Big business saw and welcomed an excuse to reduce payrolls, but at the same time lost hope of increasing profits if American subsidies were simultaneously lowered. The Communists grew afraid that their hard-won hold over the labor movement might be shaken, but made quick preparations to capitalize on the

social discontent which would almost certainly accompany deflation.

In January, General MacArthur issued a directive liberalizing foreign-investment opportunities. Although a few prewar properties were restored to foreign firms, neither Japanese nor foreign business men were visibly impressed; there was no wild rush to build new factories and import new machines.

In the Diet election of January 23, there was a momentary ray of hope for ultranationalist forces. The election gave the Democratic-Liberal Party, which, whatever it sounds like, is conservative, a clear majority, and simultaneously the Communists moved up from four seats to thirty-five. These gains on the extreme left and right were made at the expense of the moderate parties which were reduced to something like political impotence. Many observers interpreted the outcome as a joint rightist-Communist protest against American domination.

The success of the Communists in polling 10 per cent of the vote caused some lamentation, but many occupation officials down at the working level were more irritated about the smug reactionaries who were solidly entrenched for the first time since the end of the war. The Communists might

have a nuisance value, but it was the conservatives who occupied the seat of power and had the immediate means of undermining MacArthur's plans for democracy. However, the Diet had scarcely convened before rival elements in the majority party began feuding; it was questionable whether Premier Yoshida could hold his unruly factions in line, and early predictions that Japan would have a stable government for four years were hastily revised.

Immediately before and immediately after the election, two events threw the Japanese into a flat spin. One was Point Four of President Truman's Inaugural Address, urging a Bold New Program for the development of backward areas. The Japanese had been proceeding on the assumption that they would become the "workshop of Asia." They had the factories, while the rest of the Orient had the raw materials. It was the theory that these two were complementary which had led Japan into war.

American efforts to rebuild Japan's postwar economy had been interpreted as a sign that the United States, having licked Japan, was assuming foster-parenthood for the "workshop" design. Mr. Truman's proposal was therefore considered a major shift of policy. Instead of merely encouraging a freer movement of existing production, Mr.

Truman in effect proposed an increase in the total volume of production throughout Asia. Under such a plan, Japan would lose its primacy as an industrial and therefore as a potential military power.

As if that were not a sufficient jolt, along came Kenneth Royall, then Secretary of the Army, with the intimation that Japan might be a strategic liability in wartime. The Japanese had felt secure in the doctrine that they were the indispensable bulwark against Communism in Asia. They had gone to considerable pains to nurture this belief in Washington as the chief weapon in their political arsenal. With it they intended to play the Soviet Union off against the United States, pointing out the obvious economic advantages of the Soviet orbit any time the United States tried shutting off the spigots of charity. This incipient blackmail was killed off at a stroke by Royall.

And so in a few weeks Japan's position in world affairs underwent a radical transformation. As an incidental victim of the nerve war, it could not get rid of the occupation. Under Washington's nine-point stabilization program, Japan had nothing to look forward to but austerity and hard work. If Truman's Bold New Program were carried out, Japan would no longer be the only, and perhaps not even the principal, industrial power in Asia. If the Royall thesis were sustained then Japan had no military bargaining power. If Communism were to dominate China, Japan could not permit the withdrawal of American defense forces. All this had disastrous implications for the hidebound heirs of Japanese militarism.


This same succession of events had other implications for occupation authorities. General MacArthur has frequently pointed out the achievements of the occupation—his success in disarming Japan, in writing a blueprint for democratic forms of government, and in preventing wholesale suffering among the people while the nation's economy was being rebuilt. On that optimistic premise, except for the U.S.S.R.'s actions, the pressure of American public opinion might long ago have compelled a withdrawal. Nevertheless, in the lower echelons of MacArthur's headquarters, it is generally agreed that we have not even begun to fulfill the supreme commander's original objective: "... to create a na-

tion of people who will forever lead a democratic way of life. . . ."

By now the democratization problem has been recognized for what it is—a long-range educational project. The first optimism has faded; no one thinks now that a new constitution, a few institutional changes, a purge, and a bit of miscellaneous legislation will change overnight the basic social patterns of a nation. Yukio Ozaki, the 91-year-old patriarch of Japan's Diet, once expressed the opinion that three generations of unremitting effort might produce some democracy in Japan.

The problem of restoring Japan's economy assumes even more staggering proportions. Now that its overseas empire has been lost, Japan is poor and seems likely to remain so. It lacks coal, iron, oil—the essentials of modern industry. It produces barely 80 per cent of its food supply. It produces no cotton or wool, and is short of timber and chemicals for the manufacture of substitute textiles. Its main exportable surplus is manpower.

Nevertheless, with eighty million industrious citizens, Japan can hardly be called bankrupt. Since the end of the war, factories have been rebuilt and converted. New industries have been started and some old ones expanded. By the end of 1948, production had reached 62 per cent of the 1930-34 average, despite passive sabotage from some embittered *zaibatsu* quarters and despite the bumbling ineptitude of SCAP's bureaucracy. Exports showed a slow, steady increase, but economists estimated exports would have to increase sevenfold over 1948 before the country could be self-sustaining.



General MacArthur admitted in March, 1947, that a military occupation was not qualified to run Japan's national economy. Nevertheless, after two years nothing has been done to change the administrative machinery, and only one major policy decision has been produced for MacArthur's guidance. The United States sees the need of integrating Japan's economy with that of the rest of Asia; it knows that the international situation inhibits trade which has become the life-blood of these overpopulated islands, but so great is the preoccupation with European problems that no energy is left for incisive policy-planning in Asia.

General MacArthur's position is ambiguous. It is recognized that he cannot be replaced without the consent of Russia and the Far Eastern Commission, and even if a change were feasible it might not be advisable. It would be hard to find anyone with his prestige—and prestige is a powerful factor in relations with the Japanese government. But however potent MacArthur may be as a figurehead, his real authority has been steadily whittled away. At the start of the occupation he enjoyed a very large degree of autonomy, and he pushed his program with only nominal supervision from Washington. Now policy is dictated by the Army and the State Department, along with the Far Eastern Commission. Directives go out over the supreme commander's signa-

ture even though he may disagree with them, and he becomes the logical scapegoat if things go wrong. MacArthur is known to feel bitter about this turn of events. Recently he told a confidant that in 1942 when he was defending Bataan, the "boys in the back room in Washington had written him off"—and he feels today that Washington authorities are doing the same thing again.

The supreme commander finds himself in an awkward dilemma. He is under orders from Washington to carry out an austerity program which might make him lose prestige; it is bound to cause dislocations and unrest. If he executes his orders faithfully, it will be at the expense of his popularity and perhaps his reputation. If he chooses to dodge responsibility for the program, he must permit the appointment of an administrative deputy, presumably a civilian, and relinquish some part of his own authority. Neither horn of the dilemma would be attractive to a soldier of MacArthur's temperament. Because of that, the course of economic recovery in Japan may have to make up in floundering tenacity what it lacks in inspiration.

Granted that the occupation of Japan must continue, at least for the time being, it is questionable how far the United States can afford to gamble with the future of Japan and its own larger interests in the Orient. It may not be enough to say that Japan is both impoverished and undemocratized and that time will provide remedies for both afflictions. The present generation of Japanese thinks it should not have to wait for a better livelihood and a greater measure of security.

The first symptoms of rebelliousness have already appeared. The Communists found a powerful vote-getting appeal in their demand for "racial independence," and rightist politicians have not been slow to take the hint. There is a steady growth of nationalist feeling. Disillusionment is spreading. The United States has hammered home the conviction that Japan may soon be paddling its own canoe; in that situation, it may be easy for the emperor-worshipping, Communist-hating masses to renew their faith in fascist nostrums which could be as injurious to American policy as Communism.

—WILLIAM COSTELLO

## Europe

# Fear in the West

*The Europeans have recent memories of invasion; can aid, economic and military, give them security?*



To find an analogy to the present situation in that part of Europe which lies on the western side of the Iron Curtain we must go back to historical periods as distant as those of the Mongol and Turkish invasions, when there was a feeling of helplessness before an immense and mysterious force from the East. After all, western Europe was, and is, only a relatively small outlying portion of the Continent of Eurasia. Today its frontier runs roughly from Lübeck to Trieste, and to the east sit a number of divisions which, once in motion westward, would meet with insignificant military opposition. The line is now held mainly by a symbolical array of American troops, and if it were breached by the Russians, the countries behind it would be doomed to occupation. Occupation is a word which the people of western Europe know quite well, and it frightens them a good deal more than it does Americans.


For this reason we cannot expect to find the same point of view on present and future events on both sides of the Atlantic. To Americans the prospect of a Russian occupation of, say,

Italy or France is a painful one, but it is only a passing phase in the framework of a much vaster picture, one of many problems to be settled when the final accounting is made. But to an Italian or a Frenchman the problem appears in a quite different light. Occupation and liberation to them are not temporary episodes, but matters of enormous importance. Eventually we shall be liberated, they say, but our countries will be done for, our bravest people will be wiped out, and the inheritance of centuries, both material and spiritual, will be obliterated.

In neither France nor Italy today is there fear of a domestic Communist threat. That is, no one on either side of the barricades seriously believes that either a revolution or an electoral upset can bring the Communists into governmental power. But everyone believes, with reason, that the weakened Communist parties would take over on the day that a Russian army actually made an invasion. Then would come the introduction of "progressive democracy," Sovietization, the one-party system, and all the rest.

An important consequence of the fear of Russia is that although the effective strength of the French or Italian Communist Parties may at a given moment be held in check, it is difficult, if not impossible, to diminish the Communist vote. Large numbers of the 30 per cent of the populations who vote the Communist electoral tickets are not party members. They are people who say to themselves: The present Government won't penalize us for voting Communist and if the Russians come, then our Communist voting records may come in handy. Of course this





reasoning is anything but heroic, but it is an illusion to imagine that the mass of humanity is made up of heroes.

Now there are facts and figures to prove what an impulse the Marshall Plan, in spite of any defects in its functioning, has given to European economic recovery. This recovery stems chiefly not from the important material aid given but from psychological factors. For several years many European governments, especially those of Italy and France, were harassed every month with the problem of how to pay for the food and raw materials necessary to everyday life. Immediately after the war the United States stepped in to help pay the bills, but in an irregular and sporadic fashion. With the Marshall Plan Europe was freed from this recurrent worry; economic life returned to something like normal, and confidence in the future was restored so that businessmen could begin to calculate in terms of years, not weeks. The peace of mind acquired in this way has been much more of a stimulant to production and a solution to many other related problems than it is possible to evaluate in terms of goods or money.

The Marshall Plan has done away with the fear of domestic bankruptcy and the economic and social breakdown that would have followed in its train, but it cannot eliminate the fear of aggression. It is to the credit of General Marshall himself that he understood the information that was given him on this score from European sources and came up with the Atlantic Pact as an answer. The Atlantic Pact will successfully answer the purpose on one condition, namely that government circles and public opinion in the United States realize that the elimination of the fear of aggression is the pact's pri-

mary aim, and that it must be made to function with this aim in view.

Yet there is still a great deal of doubt in Europe about the continuity of American foreign policy. Many Europeans fear that as a result of some nervous reaction on the part of the American Congress or people, they may find themselves suddenly left high and dry. For instance, the recent turn of events in China has been a severe blow to the average European. Many people, of course, realized that wealthy as it is, the United States could not help both Europe and China. An even better-informed group knew in advance that American policy in China was doomed to failure because it was based on the thoroughly corrupt Kuomintang and that, unfortunately, between the Kuomintang and the Communists there was nothing else on which to base it. But there is nevertheless a general impression that after having supported the Chiang Kai-shek regime the United States let it drop like a hot potato as soon as danger threatened.

Another worry prevalent in Europe concerns what strategy America will employ in the event of war. No one in Europe will contradict the fact that Britain is the only really solid European power, with no Communist problem of any consequence and with exemplary industrial and moral strength. It is not surprising, therefore, that the United States should consider Britain its primary base on the other side of the Atlantic. But if there is reason to believe that Americans are inclined to concentrate the defense of Europe in the British Isles, then doubt and fear rise again in the European mind. Such a plan might be accepted by the various governments and by a restricted group of people who could hope to "get out from under" at the critical moment, perhaps

to seek refuge in America, organize a resistance movement, and talk inspiringly over the radio. But it would not be palatable to the millions of people who have no hope of getting away, and know that they would have to stay put and serve as objects of the Communist experiment.

The masses of western Europe care even

more than is generally thought for the western way of life; they are willing to fight for it and will fight better if they are properly armed and feel that the struggle is not hopelessly unequal. But if the program continues to be evacuation, followed by liberation, then they will think chiefly of defending themselves and their families by whatever means they are able, which implies soft-pedaling their resistance and knuckling down to the conqueror.

The United States must then try to persuade Europeans of three things: (1) that the defense of western Europe is a cornerstone of American policy and hence not subject to abrupt change or withdrawal; (2) that the United States intends to defend Europe all the way to the Lübeck-Trieste line; (3) that the United States will assure this defense itself rather than confide it to one or another European power. Let us look at these points in detail.

1. The recently published text of the Atlantic Pact seems to contain a satisfactory adjustment between the automatic obligation to spring to the assistance of any member attacked and the necessity of leaving a final decision for peace or war up to the legislative bodies of the various nations. This necessity holds good not only for the United States but for the other contracting powers as well. But it would be most unfortunate if during the debate held in the United States Senate and House of Representatives stress were to be laid on the looseness of the pact rather than on its promise of automatic action. If Congress does not reflect genuine determination, then the pact will lose much psychological effectiveness.

2. Although it cannot be helped, there is perhaps too much discussion in the American press and in public places

of problems of military strategy. The workings of American government and public opinion are still a mystery to most Europeans. They may be accustomed to discount the opinions and trial balloons of their own editors and reporters and yet be unnecessarily upset by those of an American columnist. An article by Walter Lippmann may be cause for consternation to a European and he will interpret it, according to his personal leanings, as reflecting the official opinion of Truman, Acheson, or worst of all, the Pentagon. Of course a minority of people endowed with common sense realizes that the possibility of defending Europe depends on the strength of the military forces at hand. If Russia attacks tomorrow, American troops, with all the good will in the world, can defend only a very limited area, and only when their strength is considerably bolstered can they hope to defend more. But the average European who follows the American press—or the distorted accounts furnished by his own newspapers of what it says—is in a state of understandable confusion. Every time he hears mention of a new line of defense he anxiously asks himself: Is my house, my field, my shop, my factory on this or the other side of the line? It would be far better if the United States were to change its tone and declare that it guarantees every inch of European territory. Of course, common sense shows that this is not humanly possible, but nevertheless such a declaration would give most people peace of mind and a feeling of security, and the feeling of security would go far to create the real thing.

3. Americans must take their courage in both hands and refuse to be intimidated by the accusation that by assuming the defense of Europe they are interfering with other nations' sovereignty. In order to implement the Atlantic Pact there must be a joint staff and a military commander. Let the United States come right out and say that the staff will be in large part American and the commander will be such and such an American general. If war breaks out this will necessarily

be the case, so why not set things straight from the start? Thus there will be less bickering among the various countries as to the choice of a commander-in-chief and public confidence will be immeasurably strengthened. Of course this announcement will offend some of the leading European generals of the Second World War, most of whom naturally aspire to the position, and perhaps even wound the feelings of the heads of various governments. But the man in the street—who is the one who really counts—will say: "Good, now we're getting down to business." And his sense of confidence and security will be augmented. It would be augmented even more if the commander-in-chief located strategic headquarters not in England but on the Continent, and indeed as near as possible to the line of defense.

Finally, the United States must realize that if the Atlantic Pact is to be effective it must quickly take *visible form*. Otherwise, we have the example of the Marshall Plan and other similarly organized joint efforts to warn us of how precious time may be wasted. The wasteful procedure could easily go something like this:

Once the pact is signed, the Europeans will set up a military committee in liaison with the Americans, who in their turn will send over several tons of information blanks to be filled out by the various European governments. These blanks, their weight considerably increased, will be sorted out by the central European military committee, which will require the filling out of further blanks, and the final production of a statement of European needs to be dispatched to Washington. The Americans will pick flaws in this gen-

eral statement and send it back with corrections, emendations, and more blanks to be filled out. And this process may easily drag along for months and years before the first actual shipment of arms is effected.

Meanwhile the average European will begin to grumble that, having bound up his lot with that of the United States and having, in the process, exhibited a hazardous amount of defiance toward Russia, he has only exposed himself to danger and still has no weapons with which to defend himself.

Of course a coordinated general plan and a certain number of blanks to be filled out are indispensable to efficient operation. But the United States must not wait until everything is ready. Let as many tanks, airplanes, and big guns as possible, accompanied by full publicity, be shipped to Europe without delay, even if a few wasteful errors are committed. The sooner a division of French or Italian soldiers fitted out with brand-new American equipment can parade through the streets of Paris or Rome, the more powerful the psychological effect to be obtained. Fear will dissolve and confidence will be reborn. European soldiers and their officers will have an air very different from the shabby one they have today; the man in the street will come to the conclusion that he can get on with his work without further disturbance, and, last but not least, many people will find it unnecessary to vote Communist as an insurance-premium for their own protection.

Let Americans be mindful for some time to come that the mortal disease of Europe is nothing but fear.

—A EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENT



# Industrial Jungle: the Ruhr

*The U. S. Government has given up on the job of clearing it out and has given the valley back to the Germans. Which Germans?*



Along with sunny headlines about Soviet-American efforts to break the ice-jam of Berlin, there have also been signs these May mornings of smog over the Ruhr, obscuring what is going on there. Allied statements emphasize that everything in the Ruhr is under control; German actions raise the question—whose control? Have U. S. authorities carried out the promised dissolution of western Germany's industrial trusts? General Clay says "Yes"; a committee appointed by the Secretary of the Army says "No." One may prefer to look at the brighter prospect of Berlin, but the fact is that while victory in Berlin means high political prestige, control of the Ruhr means ultimate economic power.

Four years ago, when the huge industrial plants of the Ruhr began digging themselves out of the rubble left by Allied heavy bombardment, it seemed that a lifetime might pass before the mangled valley could be reconstructed. But today coal mining in the Ruhr is back to almost three-quarters of its 1936 level, steel production is approaching half of its prewar top, and the one major remaining shortage in the Ruhr is money.

Once that shortage is overcome, there is no reason why the Ruhr should not again be the greatest industrial area in Europe. Bombardment could not decrease its basic wealth—western Europe's richest seams of coal. And the factories that stand above that coal in the crowded quadrangle between Düsseldorf and Dortmund are still models of integration—mine shafts, coke ovens, blast furnaces, and rolling mills, as well as chemical plants, often under adjoin-

ing roofs, battered but still united.

Able before the war to produce as much steel as Britain and France together, and dominated by six great combines linked by banking interlocks and marketing agreements, the Ruhr acted on Europe like a force of magnetism, attracting tributaries and satellites. And so firmly knit are these managements that twice in this century they have survived national disaster, financial breakdown, political overthrow, and foreign seizure.

The power of the Ruhr has been reduced, of course—by Allied managerial controls, by removals for reparations, by the imposition of a ceiling on steel production, and by the fact that, having shot off or sunk its working capital during the war, the Ruhr Valley is now bankrupt. But in the last few months the controls have been relaxed; under American pressure in April the agreed amount of reparations removals was slashed, and on recommendation of the ECA's Humphrey Committee, the ceiling on German steelmaking has been raised. Both the American and British governments want to help the Ruhr become solvent and, as Secretary Marshall once put it, again "capable of competing in the market place."

Of all the measures taken for the revival of the Ruhr, the broadest is Mili-

tary Government Law No. 75, issued last November, under which the management of the coal, iron and steel industries of the valley were returned to German private citizens who now, to be sure, are to act as trustees rather than owners. (Neither the subsequent Occupation Statute, which speaks of reserving to the Allies "controls in regard to the Ruhr," nor the newly-formed International Authority for the Ruhr has amended this basic law.) After four years of Allied efforts to reorganize the Ruhr and dissolve its pyramided combines, this charter tells the Germans in effect to go ahead and do it themselves. It orders "regrouping," but allows the Germans to decide which groups are to come out on top. Four years ago, at Potsdam, the Allies declared that they were for "the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production," and the subsequent directive to the U. S. Military Governor ordered him "to permit no excessive





concentrations of economic power in our zone of Germany." But since the law of last November it has by no means been clear to what extent the Allies still effectively control German heavy industry; and as for its owners, it is not only unclear who they are to be but even who they are now or what their several rights are.

Since Potsdam, Allied policy has been undermined by the actions of Soviet Russia and the fact that America and Great Britain have quite different ideas from France as to how much the Ruhr should be controlled, while Britain in turn has quite different ideas from America as to how it should eventually be owned.


The Germans, on the other hand, have but one idea, which is to control it themselves; and as Heinrich Dinkelbach, the veteran steelmaster and contributor to the S.S. now back in power as a trustee, remarks, "I don't care whether I direct a private concern in which the stockholders have little to say or a socialized concern in which the people have little to say."

Whoever dominates the Ruhr may one day reassert pre-eminent influence in western Europe. But the question of reviving Ruhr industry is coupled with the question of paying for it. The American people, having appropriated well over three billion dollars to start up the economy of western Germany (after having spent several billions to knock it out) naturally wonder where their outlays are going to end. As far as the Germans of the Ruhr are concerned, on the other hand, major outlays are just about to begin. Now that the Allies have encouraged a speedup in production, new collieries and power plants are being projected. For such new construction, as well as for reconstruction, Ruhr steelmasters say they will need about two billion marks. German private capital and the debt-ridden Bizone governments cannot, separately or together, provide anywhere near that much. This gives immediate bearing to the debate between those who would like to socialize Ruhr industry out of hand and those who want to leave it to private German citizens free to lure whatever capital they can from abroad—chiefly, as in the 1920's, from the American investor.

The American and British Military Governments, meanwhile, are trying to clean house for new private or public investment by ordering the Germans to dissolve twenty-six "excessive concentrations" in coal, iron, and steel, preparing those industries not only for a life of solvency but of virtue. However, Allied intentions as to the Ruhr's future have a way of bogging down in its sticky present realities such as the continued presence of Nazi industrialists in executive posts. The difficulty facing the Allies is that in the Ruhr they are dealing with a jungle of prop-

erty relationships so dense that the bulldozers of economic reorganization and reform have so far failed to cut a path through it. Yet while untamed carnivorous species still lurk in the undergrowth, the Allies talk hopefully of converting the Ruhr overnight into a garden—the British into the kind of well-ordered public park favored by socialism, and the Americans into a happy hunting ground for private entrepreneurs, with Germans serving as keepers and stirring up the birds.

To a citizen living in the well-anchored American system of 1949, where the rights of property are clearly defined and carefully maintained, ownership is a simple and concrete concept. But in the industrial maze of western Germany today ownership is rarely concrete and never simple, and in the Ruhr one is likely to encounter more than half a dozen different types of ownership—each with impaired rights and compromised claims. To begin with, the owner of a plant that has been dismantled and removed to another country as reparations is a rather abstract property-holder. The owner of a share of unregistered or "bearer" stock—as most Ruhr industrial shares are—who has signed away his voting rights to a now-collapsed Berlin bank and who in addition has deposited his paper in that bank where the Soviets have silently pocketed it, is an equally abstract capitalist. And even if a German shareholder enjoys the good fortune of seeing either his Ruhr plant or his own stock certificates in existence, he is likely to find that he shares ownership of his enterprise with a defunct German government, with semi-dissolved banks, with forfeited personal estates, and with bankrupt or condemned family holding companies. The enterprise, itself, moreover, is sure to be compromised in that its claims against the Reich government for delivered war goods are uncollectible, its foreign assets confiscated, and some of its domestic German properties looked on by





Allied authorities and latter-day German leaders as stolen goods.

Take the case of Vereinigte Stahlwerke, the giant holding company set up in the 1920's with the aid of \$100 million worth of bonds sold to American investors chiefly through Dillon, Read & Co. Topping a pyramid of six major Ruhr coal and steel aggregations, it commanded a total crude-steel capacity of almost ten million tons annually, and controlled a whole string of companies in the by-product fields of gas, chemicals, light metals, and electric power. This combine, sprawling athwart west-German basic industry and long slated for "regrouping," is typical of major Ruhr enterprise in that its history shows an increasing participation on the part of German government and Nazi-managed central banking. Its corporate picture, when projected across the confusion of its properties, shows highlights like these:

1. Roughly 25 per cent ownership participation by the defunct Reich government through shares bought at the start of the 1930's from Friedrich Flick and others.

2. Roughly 15 per cent ownership participation exercised by the defunct Reich government through shares confiscated without compensation in 1940 from the steelmaster Fritz Thyssen—

who has been trying to get them back.

3. About 12 per cent ownership participation by I. G. Farben, the chemicals trust dissolved by order of the Allied Control Council in 1945.

4. Voting control of between 15 and 20 per cent of Vereinigte Stahlwerke capital stock held by the now-defunct Deutsche Bank or its successors, acting as voting trustees for holders of bearer shares.

If it is difficult now to sort out property rights in Vereinigte Stahlwerke, the ownership legacy of some of its subsidiaries is even more baffling. The parent combine joined, for instance, with the monolithic Friedrich Krupp empire across the way in Essen in the ownership and management of several of the most massive Ruhr coal by-product and chemicals concerns. But in line with General Clay's recent amendment of the verdict of the U. S. Military Tribunal, all of Friedrich Krupp's properties are to be confiscated by the commanders of the zones in which they lie.

Again, Vereinigte Stahlwerke shared with the government-owned Hermann Goering heavy-industry combine the ownership of Germany's leading producer of ferro-alloys, the Gesellschaft für Electrometallurgie—a company taken over by "Aryanization" decree

from its Jewish owners. But, having liquidated the Jewish owners, the Goering combine itself moved into liquidation even before the collapse of the Nazi regime, and now it is difficult to estimate who owes what to whom.

The Vereinigte Stahlwerke maze sets the pattern for major Ruhr enterprise—a design intended to achieve orderly "vertical integration" (control by one group of every stage in the steel-making process, from coal mining to final fabrication and alloys) but more often simply the result of an indiscriminate throwing-together of assorted properties into one corporate grab bag.

With ownership in heavy industry ranging all the way from feudal family partnerships to state trusts, the Ruhr was—and is—a unique form of "mixed society." But the state mines held variously by the former Reich, the Prussian state, and west-German municipalities bear less resemblance to socialized industries than they do to commercial crown monopolies such as those held by the early Stuarts, to the anger of Puritans and Levellers. And just as there remains a certain seventeenth-century atmosphere about German state capitalism, so the aroma of the 1920's in international corporate juggling lingers over its residue.

In that between-wars merry-go-

round the U.S. bondholder played a dizzy and hapless part, first helping to set up Vereinigte Stahlwerke and re-float Krupp and Gutehoffnungshütte (the latter another coal, iron and steel combine) and ultimately letting himself be bought out at a steep discount by Berlin banks which used American apprehensions on the eve of the second war as an opportunity for cheaply liquidating German debts. Today the U. S. Treasury estimates that Americans hold about four per cent of the Ruhr's coal and steel bonds and own about two and a half per cent of Ruhr coal, chiefly through stock interest in the Hugo Stinnes enterprises.

But while the Ruhr's owners were—and are—a thicket of rank confusion, its top controllers were a small number of overarching trees. The tallest was the Nazified Deutsche Bank, whose representatives sat on the boards of nearly four hundred industrial enterprises and held seventy-six board chairmanships. In possession of almost one-fifth of all German commercial bank assets, it increased its power over the Ruhr by voting as the trustee for thousands of holders of "bearer shares." In 1946 a U. S. Military Government report on the Deutsche Bank recommended that it be liquidated and that its responsible officials be tried as war criminals. The bank has been liquidated—that is, split up into successor banks in the several Laender—but its officials like Hermann Abs and Wilhelm Zangen continue to be mighty powers in the Ruhr.

What actually has been done under Allied authority to break the traditional pattern of Ruhr control and to prepare the ground for a new order? In spite of surface changes and paper plans, the answer is—not much. "Ownership in the Ruhr industries has

been set aside," Secretary Marshall flatly declared last November—yet the fact is that while certain rights of ownership have been suspended, the structure of ownership itself has not been changed. The old owners and managers against whose "return" and "restoration" General Clay's Law No. 75 inveighs have never been thrown out.


In fact, General Clay thought that with the fewest exceptions, they shouldn't be thrown out. As he recently put it, "If you make a ruling on the fact that a man made money during the thirteen years Hitler was in, you rule out everybody of ability and experience." American and British policy, dominated by a desire for full Ruhr revival, is willing to make "efficiency" virtually the only test of management.

Another provision of Law 75 is that the assets of twenty-six coal, iron and steel combines shall forthwith be transferred to daughter companies whose shareholders shall be German trustees approved by Military Government—and these shares, in turn, when subsequently sold in one way or another, are to provide proceeds for paying off the owners and creditors of the parent concerns. But there is nothing in the law to prevent the owners of the parent concerns from using those very proceeds to buy up the shares of their daughters—thus getting back to their old stands under new names. Nor is there anything in the law to prevent the new companies from going out and buying up one another; in fact, after having described in its preamble the need for decentralization, the law turns around to say that the new steel companies under their German trustees may plan for "the merger or amalgamation of . . . assets and the absorption of additional assets which may include assets outside the field of the iron and steel industry." Little wonder that ever since General Clay in March, 1948, ordered the suspension of decartelization moves against several German industrial combines on the ground that "they are very important to us right now,"

the trust-busters in the American camp in Frankfurt have been a frustrated and embittered group.

British officials, meanwhile, have argued all along against "atomization" of Ruhr properties on the ground that the whole area had best be taken over by a future German state anyway, and they have prepared for this step by divorcing coal from steel and then tying Ruhr collieries together in one bulging package ripe for nationalization. General Clay's efficiency experts, however, with eyes on all-out private production, are willing to let the Germans return to their old system of "vertical integration" under which one company management—after its face has been lifted—will run collieries, blast furnaces, rolling mills, and maybe fabricating plants. Since the parties cannot agree, what more natural than to let Germans decide? And what more natural for the Germans who are to do the deciding than to form up in tightly-knit trustee groups that accord with the traditional German drive for central control and for so-called "order in the market"?

In a study of German business organization written four years ago, the Foreign Economic Administration warned American occupation officials that "all forms of coordination of German businessmen for economic purposes should be suspected of trying to establish nuclei for semipublic institutions similar to those which had existed during the Hitler period." Early this year the German businessmen's Bizonal Economic Administration confirmed this suspicion when it proposed five directors of major Ruhr steel and armaments combines along with the former head of the Deutsche Bank's foreign operations for the new board of trustees of the iron and steel industry. And the nominees finally accepted by the American and British military governors included Heinrich Dinkelbach, (the Vereinigte Stahlwerke chief) along with Günther Henle (a director of the Kloeckner steel combine), and Gotthard von Falkenhausen (a former





Deutsche Bank official and private banker). Trade unions are also represented on the board; but since the unions fully endorsed the appointment of the dubious Dinkelbach and his friends, they seem ready to work in one big family with him.

This family complains that it still is not free to function, since the International Authority set up last December to oversee the Ruhr delimits the market and uses of its production. But the Authority does not amend Law 75—the charter of ultimate self-determination. Under this charter, as American officialdom sees it, recombined Ruhr private firms will again become the heavyweights of west-European enterprise, newly capitalized with outside (i. e., American) help. Under the same charter, the British hope Ruhr coal and steel will become the public servants of a newly-dedicated German state. But the consequence of new American heavy investments in Germany will be, as in the 1920's, partnership with German ambitions. One recalls Gustav Stresemann's 1924 remark in his diary that "the thing to do now is to win over the individual American subscriber to the idea of a German loan. The granting of a loan would give us an army of people in America who would make propaganda for Germany because they would be interested in her welfare." British Ruhr socialization schemes, meanwhile, mean the granting of extraordinary powers to a state whose antecedents show little ability at living peaceably with the world.

In such an area and with such a legacy, to beat the drums alternately for private enterprise and public ownership is like trying to sell a composite of capitalism and socialism that combines the worst features of both. What stands out clearly against the victors' rival music is the single-minded German aim of marching on from solvency toward economic sovereignty.

The Allies still have the chance of determining the nature of that sovereignty before it overwhelms their pet illusions. The German problem, most people agree, is too large to be left to Germans to solve for themselves. But a more realistic plan is needed than either America or Britain so far has followed if it is to be solved for them.

(This is the first of two articles on problems presented by the Ruhr.)

## Platonoff's Republic

*Q. and A. on the source, use, and abuse of power within the unquestionably (or else) perfect State*



*Glaucouski, who has just been appointed commissar-president of the Soviet republic of Balkania, is finishing up a cram course in government under Platonoff, the president of the Moscow Academy of Philosophy, before proceeding to his post.*

PLATONOFF: You see, therefore, that the highest duty of man is a double duty. It is first to find his true master and submit to his master, for man's own good. But it is also to find his true inferior, and, for the good of that inferior, to keep him in his place.

GLAUCOUSKI: Nothing could be clearer. Stalin is my master, and I submit to him for my own good. The comrades I govern are my inferiors, and for their good I keep them in their place. Is that correct?

PLATONOFF: Do not hurry to congratulate yourself upon comprehending so elementary a proposition. And above all, recollect that you are always more servant than master. He who is above you is farther above you than those who are below you are below you.

GLAUCOUSKI: I apologize for presumptuousness.

PLATONOFF: Your own rights flow from the rights of those below you.

And of them all, the noblest is the right of the ignorant to be guided by the wise, even though the wise be obliged to employ force to endow the ignorant with this right.

GLAUCOUSKI: That is most illuminating. If I have the comrade philosopher's permission to inquire—

PLATONOFF: You will inquire when you are invited to inquire. Let us proceed. Who, you are about to ask, are in truth the wise, and who are in fact the ignorant?

GLAUCOUSKI: That question was on the tip of my tongue.

PLATONOFF: Tell me, is it because of the skill of its carpenters that a nation is wise?

GLAUCOUSKI: What an idea!

PLATONOFF: Of its blacksmiths and shoemakers, then?

GLAUCOUSKI: Really!

PLATONOFF: Is a nation wise because of the art of its weavers and tanners? Its roadmenders, innkeepers, longshoremen, ropemakers, choir singers, motor mechanics, druggists?

GLAUCOUSKI: Absurd!

PLATONOFF: And if I went on to enumerate all those among whom wisdom is not found, should I not end by taking a census of the vast majority of the people?

GLAUCOUSKI: You would.

PLATONOFF: Then may we not say straight off that wisdom is not to be found among the Many?

GLAUCOUSKI: It will save time.

PLATONOFF: Wherefore we are forced to conclude that wisdom is the possession of the Few?

GLAUCOUSKI: I don't see how we can avoid it.

PLATONOFF: Now I put it to you. Should a state be governed by the wise or by the ignorant?

GLAUCOUSKI: By the wise.

PLATONOFF: But we have agreed that it is the Few who are wise and the Many who are ignorant?

GLAUCONSKI: We have.

PLATONOFF: Must we not say, then, that the best government is that which is in the hands of the Few and not that which is in the hands of the Many?

GLAUCONSKI: I see no escape from that conclusion.

PLATONOFF: Good. Now let me ask you another question. Is it reasonable to say broadly that the activities of every society fall into two categories: on the one side, government, and, on the other, all forms of production—food, shelter, clothing, books, every apparatus of health, education, transport, comfort, recreation, and the rest?

GLAUCONSKI: That is a fair division, yes.

PLATONOFF: And of the two, you would say that government—that is, rule, defense, justice, administration—was the higher function?

GLAUCONSKI: We have already said as much.

PLATONOFF: And should therefore be exercised by—?

GLAUCONSKI: The Few, of course.

PLATONOFF: While the function of production would be entrusted to—?

GLAUCONSKI: The Many.

PLATONOFF: Quite so. But in that case would not the Many, being the producers in the republic, grow rich? And growing rich, would they not grow powerful? And growing powerful, would they not resent the rule of the Few and take the function of government into their own hands?

GLAUCONSKI: You persuade me that that is exactly what they would do in such case.

PLATONOFF: Would that in your view be a desirable thing or an undesirable thing?

GLAUCONSKI: The latter, beyond the shadow of a doubt.

PLATONOFF: Then what are we to do, we who are the Few?

GLAUCONSKI: I don't know, comrade philosopher.

PLATONOFF: You will agree that the Few must not only concern themselves with government, but they must also be masters of all the departments of production?

GLAUCONSKI: I do agree, now that you have pointed it out.

PLATONOFF: Now since the Few are already, in our policy, the masters of the State, is there a better way for them to become the masters of the whole nation than by placing the economy of the country under the State?

GLAUCONSKI: If there is, I cannot think of it.

PLATONOFF (continuing): Taking upon their shoulders not only the heavy duties of guardians and defenders of the State, but also the more onerous burdens that go with the management of everything that lives or exists in the nation?

GLAUCONSKI: Nobody can imagine heavier burdens, therefore nobody can imagine greater sacrifices than are thus made by the Few.

PLATONOFF: Not badly spoken. But how shall the Few go about controlling production? Or say, rather, which worker is free: he who owns his tools or he who works with the tools of his master?

GLAUCONSKI: The former, since a

worker without tools is a worker without earning power.

PLATONOFF: Without earning power, and therefore at the mercy of the tool-owner?

GLAUCONSKI: Yes.

PLATONOFF: Wherefore, if the State was the sole owner of tools, the worker would be at the State's mercy?

GLAUCONSKI: Inescapably.

PLATONOFF: Then is not State ownership of tools the ideal way to the control of production?

GLAUCONSKI: I am convinced that it is.

PLATONOFF: Let us speak now of defense. Who are to be the defenders of the State?

GLAUCONSKI: Why, the usual lot: policemen, soldiers, secret-service agents.

PLATONOFF: Will they be few or numerous?

GLAUCONSKI: The richer the State, the more of them you need.

PLATONOFF: But if they are numerous, they must be drawn from the Many?

GLAUCONSKI: Where else can they come from?

PLATONOFF: The Many, that is, among whom our defenders will have cousins, parents, lovers, childhood friends?

GLAUCONSKI: I suppose so.

PLATONOFF: And if there should arise misguided champions of the Many, will not our defenders be tempted to enroll under the banner of those false champions?

GLAUCONSKI: Certainly, if they are not prevented.

PLATONOFF: The perfect State, then, will need defenders who will not only defend it against other States, but will also, if need be, defend the Few against the Many?

GLAUCONSKI: Incontestably.

PLATONOFF: But where among the



Many shall we find these defenders?

GLAUCONSKI: Among the young and the strong, obviously.

PLATONOFF: Obviously, as you say. And should they not be those youths of strength who, like thoroughbred hounds, are keenest of scent, swiftest in pursuit, cruellest in tearing their prey to pieces?

GLAUCONSKI: Let us have none but swift hounds about us.

PLATONOFF: Now, would you say it was a wise thing that the strong should fight against the strong?

GLAUCONSKI: Personally, when I go to a wrestling bout, I like to see men evenly matched.

PLATONOFF: But if the strong fought the strong, would not our purpose be defeated, since they would end by killing one another off, and leave the State undefended?

GLAUCONSKI: That never occurred to me.

PLATONOFF: Wherefore you would say, would you not, that for the good of the State, the strong should be trained to fight only the weak?

GLAUCONSKI: You mean only the Many.

PLATONOFF: But the Many, we said a moment ago, are their friends and relations. How are we to train our defenders in this kind of warfare?

GLAUCONSKI: Put them in uniform. Take them out on parade and drill them. Teach them to handle arms.

PLATONOFF: And will training alone teach them who their enemies are?

GLAUCONSKI: No, I suppose not.

PLATONOFF: Is not the inculcation of a warlike spirit even more to our purpose than a knowledge of drill? Can we better instill that spirit in the young and the fiery than by training them, like house-dogs, to hate all who are not of their household?

GLAUCONSKI: That's the idea!

PLATONOFF: Tell me, now, what is hatred?

GLAUCONSKI: Why, it's a feeling.

PLATONOFF: Is it like food, will it fill your belly?

GLAUCONSKI: No.

PLATONOFF: Is it something men desire and will work to obtain?

GLAUCONSKI: I don't think so.

PLATONOFF: Can it be bought with money?

GLAUCONSKI: I never heard that there was a market for it.

PLATONOFF: Then what incentive

shall we give our fine young men to hate?

GLAUCONSKI: I don't know.

PLATONOFF: If that is so, you will have to find out. I am bound to warn you, comrade commissar, that unless you can recruit and train a corps of haters, a police, whose lives will hang upon your word, you had better not attempt to govern the perfect State.

GLAUCONSKI: I see that clearly, but what do you advise, comrade philosopher?

PLATONOFF: Tell me this. When men wield power, are they tempted to use it sparingly or to abuse it?

GLAUCONSKI: Well, abuse it, I imagine.

PLATONOFF: And if they abuse it, and see that they are not punished for abusing it—which do they feel, contempt or respect, for those who are too weak to punish them?

GLAUCONSKI: They feel contempt for the weak.

PLATONOFF: And go on feeling contempt until their contempt turns into a raging hatred of the weak? And their pleasure is no longer the pleasure of mere domination, but is now the pleasure of giving vent to their hatred?

GLAUCONSKI: It seems it would be so.

PLATONOFF: Would not their power, in that case, constitute its own incentive and its own compensation—the first because of the primitive joy of hating and brutalizing, the second because the fear they inspired would bring to our human hounds offers of women and wine, entry into any circle they chose to break into, and all the rest?

GLAUCONSKI: Of course. They would be getting something for nothing

and would be having a wonderful time getting it.

PLATONOFF: And, possessing a sense of their own power over the Many, would they not also possess a keen sense of the greater power held by the Few over themselves? Especially if occasional judicious blood purges were administered by way of example?

GLAUCONSKI: Yes, yes.

PLATONOFF: And would they not cringe and fawn before the Few as savage house-dogs cringe and fawn before their masters?

GLAUCONSKI: They would.

PLATONOFF: And unless you can suggest a better way—which I permit myself to doubt—is not this a sober, rational mode of training the defenders of our State and our good people?

GLAUCONSKI: I wish you would write it all down for me. I want to get it by heart.

PLATONOFF: Your plane leaves in ten minutes. Let us sum up. The Few must rule, because they are the wise. They must rule, however, for the good of the Many. Therefore, the Few must respect the natural right of the Many to be guided by the Few. To fulfill this high purpose they must control both the economic life and the political administration of the nation. And in order to remove from the Many the temptation to forget their right of subservience and do themselves violence, the State must possess defenders who hate the Many and who fear the Few. Government, comrade commissar, is as simple as that. I may tell you, since you seem to understand this so well, that the heresiarch, Hitler, learned this truth even before we did. Farewell. The idols of the Red Square go with you. The lesson is ended.

—LEWIS GALANTIERE





# The Absolute Weapon?



When on March 2 an Air Force B-50 bomber landed in Texas after the first nonstop circumnavigation of the globe, Lieutenant General Curtis E. LeMay, chief of the Strategic Air Command, proclaimed that the United States could now "deliver the atom bomb to any part of the world where it may be required." The statement was probably inexact; it certainly was grossly impolitic. But it did demonstrate how far, as a nation, we have come since 1945 when we first contemplated the horror which our scientists had incredibly placed in our hands.

In those days, between the actuality of the atomic bomb, on the one hand, and, on the other, the realization that no invention with such vast scientific and industrial potentialities could ever simply be undone, we were staggered alternately by excitement and dismay. The sole "hope of civilization," as President Truman put it, seemed to lie in some kind of "international arrangements looking, if possible, to the renunciation" of the weapon while "encouraging the use of atomic energy . . . toward peaceful and humanitarian ends." There was no hypocrisy in those words, and millions of Americans agreed passionately. Three and a half years later General LeMay—a high officer with important responsibilities for the formulation of national plan and policy—could announce bluntly that the U.S. was now ready to deliver atom bombs wherever "required."

The last word is in itself a dangerous portmanteau expression, enclosing a whole series of unstated concepts that in late 1945 would have seemed profoundly shocking. Yet LeMay's remark evoked relatively little comment.

Something very serious has hap-

pened, almost unnoticed, in these last three and a half years. The atom bomb, which seemed in 1945 a revolutionary horror that had to be confined and controlled, has decidedly entered into our political and strategic calculations, achieved acceptance in our minds, and become almost a commonplace of international relations. The agonies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have receded into history; and the idea that men should again inflict such tortures and holocausts upon one another is by no means so "unthinkable" as it was right after the Pacific victory. Why?

To lay it solely to an obstinate and illogical refusal on the part of Soviet Russia to accept the United Nations control plan seems insufficient. The Soviet Union has certainly been obstinate and its logic is peculiar. The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, however, did more than indict Soviet stupidity and recalcitrance in its Third Report of May 17, 1948: "The commission has been forced to recognize that agreement on effective measures for the control of atomic energy is itself dependent on broader fields of policy," fields beyond the commission's competence. This was at least a tacit admission of what some had long suspected—that the bases on which the UN control plan had been erected were fundamentally faulty, that they did not correspond to the actual political and military factors involved in the problem.

The question is already before us as to whether a new way of dealing with the atomic problem must not be found, or at any rate sought. And at this moment P. M. S. Blackett's *Fear, War, and the Bomb* (Whittlesey House, \$3.50) is dropped into the stew in which we find ourselves, with a very considerable splash. I do not think it is a good book, a wise or even a very honest one. But I wonder whether it may not help clarify a muddled and amorphous situation. The book seems

to me wrong headed and frequently mischievous. It exhibits copiously the vice of many books written by technical or scientific experts on subjects beyond their special competence. Professor Blackett is a Nobel Prize winner in physics and was decorated for his wartime work in operational analysis (the application of scientific techniques to strategic and tactical problems). No one, the reader may easily assume, could be better qualified to write about the atomic bomb, especially in its strategic aspects; and his verdicts come clothed in all the apparent authority which this assumption implies. It is a spurious authority. Whatever Professor Blackett knows about nuclear physics, he is lamentably ignorant of the simplest principles of historiography; he is scandalously careless with his sources and supporting data; and he imputes motives and deduces conclusions with a scarcely scientific recklessness.

It is curious that the scientist outside his science is so often incorrigibly unscientific; and unfortunate that he carries his air of authority into quite illegitimate fields, too frequently concealing what he is really up to. What Professor Blackett is up to is not the "brilliant analysis," the "appeal to reason," the "inexorable logic" ascribed to him by his blurb-writers. It is something much easier than that. It is an elaborate defense of the Soviet Union against the





implied charge flung by the UN Atomic Energy Commission. It states the Soviet position much better (for Western audiences, since it is written by a Western intellectual) than Mr. Gromyko ever was able to do.

The Blackett thesis can, I think, be fairly resolved into four propositions.

1. The atomic bomb is not an "absolute weapon." It is a super-bomb of frightful potentialities, but would not necessarily be any more decisive in war than were the "conventional" bombs of the last war.

2. The dropping of the bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not produce the defeat of Japan. Moreover, it was not even intended to. The bomb was deliberately dropped upon an already defeated nation for purely political reasons—to forestall the Russians, who opened their own offensive in Manchuria only two days later. The hundred-thousand-odd dead of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were thus simply incidental victims of the "first move in the cold war."

3. There was nothing "generous" about the Lilienthal-Baruch-United Nations control plan. Through all its preliminary stages the plan offered Russia nothing in return for what it was asked to do in the way of opening its economy to inspection and its strategic installations to possible espionage, and there was no certain guarantee that in the end the United States might not welsh on its undertakings and retain its accumulated stock of bombs after having rendered it impossible for Russia to produce any.

4. Even if the plan did succeed in abolishing the atomic weapon, it would

leave an international authority dominated by powers hostile to the Soviet system in absolute control of the development of atomic energy for industrial use. Russia, relatively backward in the development of conventional energy sources, has much more need for the industrial exploitation of atomic energy than the other economies, but this plan would give the competing and hostile "capitalistic" states a stranglehold on Russia in this respect.

It is easy to point to various flaws in these contentions. The charge that the Hiroshima bomb was really aimed at the Soviet Union rather than at Japanese resistance is a product of tortured inference and suspicion, perhaps plausible at first reading but with no valid historical foundation whatever. The industrial application of atomic energy on any significant scale almost certainly lies so far in the future that Professor Blackett's heavy emphasis on this factor seems very dubious. More suggestive than the flaws or misrepresentations in the argument, however, is its self-consistency. Each part has an obvious relation to the rest. Thus, if the bomb really is an "absolute weapon," the statement that Russia was offered no compensation under a control plan promising its abolition becomes grotesque. To justify (even from Russia's own point of view) the stubborn Soviet recalcitrance to control, it is necessary to establish that the bomb really did not decide the Japanese war, that it is in fact, as Stalin has supposed, simply another bomb, albeit of super-proportions.

Professor Blackett has thus given us the Russian case in a self-consistent, seemingly reasoned and plausible form. It is impossible to accept many of its implications, but it is equally impossible to deny that this is the Russian case, proceeding logically from its own assumptions. It is a case which the Lilienthal-Baruch-UN plan was never designed to meet, and so long as the Soviet policy-makers continue to believe its assumptions, it is

one for which that plan cannot afford an answer. Whether the bomb is or is not an "absolute weapon" nobody knows. But if the Russians think it is not, no control scheme resting on the opposite assumption is likely to have much chance. And few who recall the atmosphere and discussions of 1946, out of which the UN plan grew, can have much doubt that this plan did rest very largely upon the opposite assumption. Blackett now holds that the UN plan, like the Soviet counter-plan, was offered with no idea that it would be accepted. This seems to me a completely unwarranted slur on such men as Lilienthal, Baruch, Acheson, and the western members of the control commission.

The idea that the bomb was so overpowering a weapon that it might force an end of all war and lead to an international society of consent was certainly not absent from American thought at the time. The authors of the UN plan were scarcely so naive as this, but they were inclined to dismiss the inevitable Russian objections on the ground that Russia's own interest in securing some control of the horror would bring the Kremlin around in due course. This has not happened, and Professor Blackett's book is a very clear and convenient exposition of what it has not happened. The Russians simply did not accept the most basic assumption underlying the control plan; and in the light of after-knowledge, it is possible to see that a great deal in the design and formulation of the control plan might have been quite



## Letters

# To The Reporter

### From the Near South

To the Editor:—As a Southerner my basic approach is that of a gradualist in a hurry. Having lived away from the South for the past ten years, I know that it is easy to look at the South from the outside and be glib about it; it is exceedingly difficult to live in the South and live up to one's convictions.

Southern conservatives' intolerance for the critic and the "foreigner" is sublime. The Southerner who violates the basic mores is not so much the subject of disagreement; he is expelled from the body of respectability and regarded as a leper.

So-called liberal editors of the South—and their contribution within the present framework is very large—must fit themselves into the pattern of respectability. An editor can advocate decent, equal toilet facilities for Negroes at railroad and bus stations. But it would be suicidal to advocate that Negroes and whites use the same toilet. The idea would be as shocking as the suggestion that men and women use the same facilities in Grand Central Station.

Any Northerner entering the South, even as a servant of United States Steel, must satisfy local elders that he is ready to abide by the Southern rules and customs. (And how frequently I have heard Northerners applaud the Southerners' attitude toward the Negro!)

Undoubtedly much progress has been made in the South in the last seventy-five years. Since the turn of the century, lynchings have dropped from around a hundred to one or two a year. Prisoners are no longer leased for labor to private companies and have been taken out of the mines.

Police brutality toward the Negro, still horrible, is not so unchecked as it was a short time ago. Southern politicians are beginning to realize they must think in terms of providing better educational and health facilities for the Negro. The war gave Negroes a degree of financial independence few of them had ever enjoyed. The New Deal did an amazing amount of good in the South and resulted in new attitudes in many places.

But the fight to win the mind of the South to a critical examination of its own plight still is of the highest importance. One way to approach the goal is to transfer economic power to the dispossessed, so they will realize that it no longer is necessary for men to go hungry, live in shacks, and act like slaves. This economic power can be transferred in a number of ways. Cio organizing in the South is one of the most hopeful developments of the last few years.

The defeat of the Dixiecrats in the last

election showed the people are aware that such movements are sponsored by the most archaic business and political leaders in the region. In a few states progressive-minded men have been elected to public office—Hill and Sparkman of Alabama, Arnall of Georgia, Pepper of Florida, Kefauver of Tennessee. These men have varying faults, but they know the score economically.

As for Walter George and Harry Byrd, I regard them as little different from Bilbo and Rankin (who incidentally, have more enlightened voting records than the former). Byrd and George simply have more cultivated manners, and I am afraid that they typify a large section of the Southern ruling class. They are as much interested in keeping the poor white in his place as the Negro. And the amazing thing is, the poor whites support them.

The main, unresolved question is: How fast do you go? Many Southerners insist that civil-rights proposals put Southern political progress back many years. But if there is no prodding there is little progress. I would be temperate in my criticism of those in the South who seem to be going too slowly. But I would want the Federal government to follow the example of the Supreme Court in interpreting the Constitution broadly and fairly and insisting on equal rights. Lincoln's statement that he would not be a slave and therefore could not be a master should become a living motto.

A TRANSPLANTED SOUTHERNER  
Washington, D. C.

### A Blank Spot

To the Editor:—I am glad that you have found a blank spot in our magazine coverage and have adequately covered it with *The Reporter*. Your policy, aims and ambitions are splendid.

R. A. BOARTS  
Crowell-Collier Publishing Co.  
New York

### Comprehensive

To the Editor:—Let me first of all send you my most sincere congratulations on what seems to me a very successful accomplishment. The news content and the expressions of opinion given in this issue are stimulating and satisfying. I am convinced, to the average intelligent American reader, and my impression is that those who read this first issue will most decidedly wish to read further issues. I like the format and the typography. The spe-

different. It had implications which were never adequately tested and explored by its authors; its assumption involved those "broader fields of policy" which were too easily overlooked, and which have returned now to deadlock the Atomic Energy Commission and its necessarily technical approach to the control problem.

If this were all, one might ask simply for a new start. Unfortunately it is not all, for history is never static. As the Russians hardened in their refusal to accept the bomb as an "absolute weapon" which must be controlled at all cost, the Americans began imperceptibly to receive it into their thought as a practical instrument of power which perhaps should not even be controlled at all.

If the Kremlin should, improbably, reverse its stand tomorrow and accept the UN plan lock, stock and barrel, it seems to me at least doubtful whether American opinion and particularly the American Senate would be in any hurry to agree. For the whole situation has passed far beyond the moods of 1946. In the actual power balance of today the bomb has become the trump card, almost the only card, in the American hand.

So we have come to an uneasy balance perched upon the atom. The Russians are restrained by an atomic threat which they could not certainly ward off; we are restrained by the threat of the Soviet ground army divisions which we could not certainly keep out of western Europe. The UN control plan has little relevance to this grim situation; certainly the Russian counterplan (as Blackett inferentially admits) has none, and one is inclined to believe that no plan of control is possible until better political foundations for it are discovered in those "broader fields" which lie outside the Atomic Energy Commission's competence.

We have a kind of balance of power now that is sufficiently revolting in its implications. If it ever breaks down, however, an appalling savagery might be released upon the world. But it may endure for a considerable time; it may even endure until the rebuilding of a strong western Europe relieves the pressure and does make possible the political solutions which may permit the control of the air and atomic terror.

—WALTER MILLIS



cial articles are interestingly, and in some cases brilliantly, written, and are certainly most effective. The coverage of the most important issues of the moment is decidedly comprehensive.

SUMNER WELLES  
Oxon Hill, Maryland

### *Informative*

To the Editor:—Thank you for sending me a copy of the first edition of *The Reporter*, which I read with a great deal of interest. It is a splendid magazine and very informative. I have heard a lot of favorable comments about it.

ESTES KEFAUVER  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.

### *Cool and Vigorous*

To the Editor:—I like the idea of the magazine, which seems to me fundamentally to be a series of editorial essays on vital subjects. I like the style, which is fresh, cool, and vigorous. I like particularly the amount of good material packed into a brief space in the articles. The type I find easy to read. I don't care for the cover, which seems to me, unlike the rest of the magazine, too dullish. And I wonder whether the magazine is not going to need the variety which perhaps a few departments might add to it. I find that I want to subscribe to it, which is perhaps the soundest compliment I can give it.

HENRY SEIDEL CANBY  
New York

### *Room*

To the Editor:—I chanced to pick up at my home your periodical and upon reading it became spellbound. There is certainly room for such a magazine as yours to illumine the facts and be a guide to more industrial progress.

MAX PASTERNAK  
New York

### *A Great Contribution*

To the Editor:—I read your magazine and was crazy about it, and it should certainly get a tremendously favorable reaction. . . . Everybody was so interested in it in Italy that I had to leave my copy over there. . . . *The Reporter* promises to be, in my opinion, a truly great contribution to current thinking during these difficult and important times.

NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER  
New York

### *Re Anonymity*

To the Editor:—I found *The Reporter* extremely rewarding reading. I admired the combination of lucidity and distinction of style in all the writers, and the topics and points of view struck me as fresh and valuable.

I enjoyed just as much in a different way the drawings and cartoons. They are far

above any political illustration that I have seen in a long while. . . .

If I were to criticize any part of this number, I should say only two things: that the headings of the articles are quite unalluring; indeed they are either trite or misleading, and if this is the effect not of accident but of policy, I should change the policy. Similarly I find it disturbing not to know the authors of some of the best articles, and to find the few that are signed tacked at the end with a too-inconspicuous name.

JACQUES BARZUN  
New York

### *More Facts*

To the Editor:—I am one of the readers whom you hope to reach. I think I know what you're driving at, and I think it's worth a try.

*The Reporter* strikes me as a sincere, well-intentioned, and fairly effective endeavor to acquaint American people with the essential facts affecting their lives. It falls short of complete effectiveness in assuming too great a basic knowledge of facts. I repeat: I feel that you should start with *what is being done* and conclude with *what it means to you and me*. Remember Lincoln: "If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it."

WILLIAM H. LEDGARD  
Maynard, Massachusetts

### *A Certain Need*

To the Editor:—I've looked over the prospectus and the first copy of *The Reporter* and, although I've heard some reactions around here which were not favorable, my feelings are to the contrary. I think a particularly good job was done, especially considering that it was the first issue, and I especially liked the general makeup and approach.

I like the non-prejudiced point of view that the general run of the articles take, and I do feel that a magazine of this type fills a certain kind of need which no other magazine known to me fills.

CHARLES B. BEAR  
Time-Life International  
New York

### *Responsible*

To the Editor:—It has seemed to me also that there is a pressing need for a journal whose objective is to extract and assay the basic ingredients of this country's national policy from the standpoint of the general welfare. On the whole, I think that *The Reporter* has made a promising start in carrying out this stated aim. The general premises, as set forth in the prospectus and adhered to throughout the first issue, the style, the obvious preference for honesty and accuracy as opposed to

the smartness which too often characterizes the efforts of other current-events magazines are most gratifying to behold. I was especially impressed by the sense of journalistic responsibility and historical perception shown in the choice of Point Four as the main topic of the first issue.

JAMES E. McNULTY  
New York

### *Brisk and Lively*

To the Editor:—I have read *The Reporter* from cover to cover, and I must congratulate you on the production. I like format, type, illustrations. I like the text, too. . . . The style is brisk and lively, and there is no falling off or diversity. This is important, I think. You will gradually build your own style on *The Reporter*.

HERBERT ELLISTON  
Editor, Washington Post  
Washington

### *Clueless Cover*

To the Editor:—I think I can safely say that there is not a banal thing in the whole issue, not a phrase. Inasmuch as I venture to regard myself as being at least averagely well informed and interested in current affairs, I suppose it might interest you to know that the magazine does indeed seem fresh. It avoids platitudes and yet is not esoteric. I think that's fine.

You really get somewhere with devoting a whole issue to one general theme. The overshadowing problem is whether you will really get the readers you deserve. You don't make it easy for them by giving any clues on the cover.

ARTHUR WILSON  
Dartmouth College  
Hanover, New Hampshire

### *A Place for Itself*

To the Editor:—I found several things in the first issue of *The Reporter* which interested me. It looks like something that should make a place for itself in the American scheme of things.

BEN HIBBS  
Editor, *The Saturday Evening Post*  
Philadelphia

### *Healthy Sign*

To the Editor:—I was very pleased at the opportunity to read the first issue of your fine magazine *The Reporter*. It is important that the liberal idea be communicated to as many Americans as possible, and I consider the appearance of a new journal friendly to the things we believe in to be a very healthy sign.

HUBERT H. HUMPHRY  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.

*Sixteen major dailies are published in Berlin, nine in the Allied sectors. (There are eight in Greater New York)*

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